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Concepts of Maritime Security: A Strategic Perspective on Alternative Visions for 
Good Order and Security at Sea, with Policy Implications for New Zealand 
Abstract 
This project originated as a research report conducted for the Royal Australian Navy’s Sea Power Centre – 
Australia. Its intent is not to reprise well‐worn ideas of sea power or maritime strategy, but to address 
conceptually what is meant by the term “maritime security” in the context of contemporary ideas of the 
meaning of “security” itself. In doing so, I have purposefully delved into some of the often quite dense and 
sometimes arcane literature and ideas regarding conceptual treatments of security. This is important, 
because the ideas inherent in different perspectives on maritime security often have an intellectual or 
political lineage linking directly to perspectives on security, in general. The analysis inevitably reflects my 
own bias as an academic strategist, and treats the conceptual debate with what one hopes is a healthy 
scepticism. Indeed, despite the conceptual nature of the subject matter, I have attempted to link the 
analysis to real world strategic issues of relevance. Ultimately, the discussion paper offers some practical 
implications for both policymakers and navies, keeping in mind the important injunction that strategy, 
ultimately, is a practical matter, with real world consequences. Because it was originally drafted for the 
Royal Australian Navy (RAN), there are a number of Australian examples used throughout. In the main, I 
have revised the original work with a new emphasis upon its relevance to the New Zealand situation. 
During the revision, however, it became clear that much of the Australian policy experience with maritime 
security and management issues remains relevant to New Zealand, and it is hoped that there will be 
opportunities for lessons to be learned both from Australia’s policy advances and its missteps. 
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but  to  address  conceptually what  is meant  by  the  term  “maritime  security”  in  the  context  of 
contemporary  ideas of the meaning of “security”  itself. In doing so, I have purposefully delved 
into  some  of  the  often  quite  dense  and  sometimes  arcane  literature  and  ideas  regarding 






subject matter,  I have attempted  to  link  the analysis  to real world strategic  issues of relevance. 
Ultimately,  the discussion paper offers  some practical  implications  for both policymakers  and 
navies, keeping  in mind the  important  injunction that strategy, ultimately,  is a practical matter, 
with real world consequences. Because  it was originally drafted  for  the Royal Australian Navy 
(RAN), there are a number of Australian examples used throughout. In the main, I have revised 
the original work with a new emphasis upon its relevance to the New Zealand situation. During 








a New  Zealand  flavour,  and  generously  offered  to  publish  it. Without  his  good  offices  this 
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the  University  of  Waikato  (MA  in  Defence  and  Strategic  Studies),  and  the  University  of 
Wollongong  (Ph.D.). His  current  research  includes work on  the  strategic  impact of  the  rise of 
China,  U.S.  maritime  strategy,  maritime  security  in  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  naval 
developments  in  the  Asia‐Pacific  region,  the  implications  of  climate  change  for  navies  and 
maritime domain awareness. He has published widely on  issues related  to regional navies and 
maritime security, Taiwan’s security, and Australian maritime security and defence policy. His 






people  and  its  leaders.  This  extensive work  provides  insights  and  opportunities  for  scholars, 
policy analysts and policy makers  to  find  the origin of schools of  thought and opinion directly 
and  indirectly associated with the security of the nautical estate.   It also re‐affirms the practical 



















The  term  “security”  has  become  ubiquitous  for  contemporary  policymaking.  This  has  been  a 
growing  trend over  the past quarter  century, but has  increased markedly  since  the  end of  the 
Cold War. The  salience of  traditional military  threats,  especially war between major powers  – 
and,  in particular, nuclear conflict –  receded  in  the minds of many analysts and policymakers. 
The  traditional  concerns  of  strategists  increasingly  became  subsumed  during  the  1990s  by  a 
revitalized wave of thinking about national and international security that tended to emphasize 
all manner  of  “security”  challenges  other  than  conventional war,  particularly  so‐called  “non‐
traditional” security  issues.1 Strategic studies increasingly gave way to “security studies” as the 








lobbyists  the  world  over  have  in  many  ways  attempted  to  influence  or  manipulate  policy 
agendas by formulating and marketing their favoured policy interests as national security issues. 
Almost  anything,  it  seems,  can become  an  issue of national  security  if one  tries hard  enough: 
tackling the problem of illegal drugs thus becomes a “war on drugs” rather than a healthcare and 
crime  issue,  whereby  transnational  criminal  syndicates  are  viewed  as  undermining  national 






“Track  II”  diplomacy  fora,  considerable  effort  was  given  to  developing  a  conceptual  prism 
through which  to  view  and  apply  the  new  security  agenda(s)  to  the  perceived  international 






the  term  is  used  to  describe  different  things  or  conditions.  The  question  is  less  one  of what, 
exactly, is maritime security? Rather, it perhaps is better phrased as what are the different ways 
in which  to  conceive  of maritime  security? And what  are  the  implications  for policy,  and  for 
navies, of these different conceptions?  
 
                                                 
1 For a good overview of non-traditional security threats in the contemporary international setting see 
Michael E. Brown, ed., Grave New World: Security Challenges in the 21st Century, Georgetown University 
Press, Washington, D.C., 2003. 
2 The Australian counterterrorism expert, David J. Kilcullen, for example, convincingly argues that the 
Islamist terrorist threat is best thought of as a global insurgency in “Countering Global Insurgency,” The 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, August 2005, pp. 597-617. 
3 Ironically, one of the more serious threats to the global food supply are the diversion of crops that 
otherwise would be used for food, to produce ethanol.  
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It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  best  studies  of  the  meaning  of  maritime  security  for  the 
contemporary world  continue  to  be  produced  from within  the  traditional maritime  strategy 
community, most notably by Geoffrey Till in his development of the idea of “good order at sea.”4 
As members  of  the maritime  strategy  and  naval  communities well  understand, many  “non‐
traditional” security issues have, in fact, been traditional concerns for most navies, albeit rising or 
declining in relative importance depending on the threat environment of the day. This may be a 




it  analyses  the  broader  debate  on  security  concepts  as  context  for  conceptual  thinking  on 
maritime security; second, it outlines different conceptual perspectives on maritime security; and 






                                                 
4 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century, Frank Cass, London, 2004, chap. 10. See 
also earlier versions of Till’s work: “Developments in Maritime Security” in Peter Cozens, ed., New 
Zealand’s Maritime Environment and Security, Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Victoria 
University of Wellington, Wellington, 1996, pp. 5-27; and “Maritime Power and the Twenty-first Century” 
in Till, ed., Seapower: Theory and Practice, Frank Cass, Ilford, Essex, 1994, pp. 176-199. 









1980s, a period of heightened Cold War  tensions. The origins of  the movement  to  expand  the 
definition and scope of security  issues away  from  the predominantly military‐strategic focus of 
the  Cold War  were  to  be  found  in  Europe,  the  geographical  heart  of  renewed  superpower 
animosities and  the centre of  the most  immediate nuclear dangers at  that  time. The end of  the 
Cold War hastened the trend towards refashioning the agenda of international security analysis 
towards new and expanding emphases upon challenges  to  the well‐being not only of  the state, 
but also of individuals and communities at a sub‐state level and, beyond the level of the state, of 
security at the regional and even global levels. The academic discipline of strategic studies began 
to give way  to a  corresponding growth  in  so‐called “security  studies,” either  rationalized as a 
necessary  expansion  to  the  narrowness  of  (military)  focus  of  traditional  strategic  studies  or 
promoted as an entirely new sub‐field within the study of International Relations.6  
 
To  some  extent  the  debate  is  submerged  in  unnecessary  semantics, with  the  term  “security 
studies” sometimes employed  interchangeably with  that of strategic studies.7 Beyond  the mere 
inter‐  and  intra‐disciplinary musings  of political  scientists,  however,  there  remains  a pressing 
                                                 
5 For a recent overview of the current state of security studies see Alan Collins, ed., Contemporary Security 
Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. See also Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James and 
Patrick M. Morgan, Security Studies Today, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1999; and Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver 
and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1998. 
6 On the perceived need for a broadening of strategic studies, see Ken Booth, “War, Security and Strategy: 
Towards a Doctrine For Stable Peace” in Booth, ed., New Thinking about Strategy and International 
Security, HarperCollins, London, 1991, pp. 370-372; whilst Barry Buzan made the case for the 
establishment of a new sub-field of “International Security Studies” in People, States and Fear: An Agenda 
for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed., Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel 
Hempstead, 1991, pp. 23-25. For a concise, if self-serving (see fn. 7 below), history of the development of 
security studies see Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, “After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and 
Future of Security Studies” in Collins, Contemporary Security Studies, pp. 383-402.  
7 When Stephen M. Walt used the term in an early post-Cold War article on the state of the discipline, for 
example, he was referring to strategic studies rather than any new or greatly expanded field of study: “The 
Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 2, June 1991, pp. 211-239. 
In large part any confusion is due to the fact that the term “international  security studies” is commonly 
used to describe strategic studies in American academe, where the field has also increasingly been 
integrated into International Relations theorizing, more generally. This has had the unfortunate effect of 
undermining its value to policymakers and the policy debate as academics chase the illusory goal of 
ultimate parsimony and elegance in highly abstract theory building and testing; for as Colin S. Gray 
reminds us, strategic studies, and strategy, “pre-eminently, is a practical subject.” Gray, Strategic Studies: 
A Critical Assessment, Westport, CT, 1982, p. 8. See also Richard K. Betts, “Should Strategic Studies 
Survive?” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1997, pp. 26-30. Wæver and Buzan, in “After the Return 
to Theory,” in effect attempt to usurp strategic studies by transforming it into little more than an historical 
artefact of “security studies.” This is both unhelpful and misleading: as a “practical subject” for the specific 
study of the use, or threat of use of force in world politics, policy-relevant strategic studies remain not only 
useful, but important. Strategic studies and security studies might thus be best thought of as separate, albeit 
related, sub-fields of intellectual endeavour.  






Barry  Buzan  has  proposed  that  the  concept  of  security  can  only  be  fully  understood  by 
integrating  the  interdependent  “levels  of  analysis”  and  “issue  sectors”  or  “dimensions”  of 
security. Buzan’s levels of analysis are individual, national and international (both regional and 
system‐wide) security, while his issue sectors comprise military, political, societal, economic and 
environmental security.8 Other analysts  in  the security studies  field  follow a similar conceptual 








identifiable  (usually minority) groups  is directly  related  to  the quality of  the  relationship  they 
each maintain with  the state  itself and, also,  to  the extent  that  the  state can protect  them  from 
externally generated “threats.” The emphasis on this level can be thought of as being coterminous 
with  the  idea of “human  security.”9 The  relationship between  individuals and  the  state can be 
positive, neutral or negative: the state may enhance the security of individual citizens and groups 
by  the  provision  of  law  and  order,  economic  opportunities  or  social  welfare  facilities,  for 
example,  or  similarly,  detract  from  individual  security  by  infringing  basic  human  rights  or 
tolerating harmful  levels of  industrial pollution. There also exists a conflict between  individual 
security and individual liberty: the more security that is sought by individuals (and provided by 
the state),  the greater  the extent  to which  freedoms must be  foregone  (and vice versa). And as 
Buzan has noted, the more powerful the state grows (internally), the more likely it is that the state 
itself will, paradoxically, become  a  “source of  threat”  to  individual  security.10 This has been  a 
common  concern  of  civil  libertarians  in  the post‐9/11 world, whether  in Australia,  the United 
States or elsewhere in the West. 
 
Many  aspects  of  Buzan’s  issue  sectors,  in  terms  of  threats  to  security,  can  also  be  viewed  as 
affecting primarily individuals or sub‐state groups rather than the state as a whole. The adverse 
impacts of  free  trade  (and “globalization” more generally) upon certain  industry  sectors or on 
particular parts of the population (such as unskilled workers, for example) of a state, while the 
national economy derives collectively, on balance, favourable economic outcomes, represents an 
example  of  this  type  of phenomenon. Nevertheless, Buzan  importantly  states  that, due  to  the 
“independent  importance of  the  state  and  system  levels of  security  analysis,”  an  emphasis on 
national and international security must remain the “main focus of analysis.”11  
                                                 
8 Buzan, People, States and Fear, esp. pp. 363-368. Buzan uses the term “dimensions of security” in “Is 
International Security Possible?” in Booth, New Thinking about Strategy and International Security, pp. 
34-39. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, Security, pp. 5-7, alternatively employ five levels of analysis: 
international systems, international subsystems, units (actors), subunits (groups) and individuals. 
9 See William T. Tow, Ramesh Thakur and In-Taek Hyun, eds., Asia’s Emerging Regional Order: 
Reconciling Traditional and Human Security, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2000; Judith 
Banister and Peter Johnson, Human Dimensions of Asian Security, CRM 95-230, Center for Naval 
Analyses, Alexandria, VA, March 1996; and Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, 2nd 
ed., Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2005, chap. 9. 
10 Buzan, People, States and Fear, chap. 1, esp. pp. 37-39. 
11 Ibid., p.51. 






“national  interest,”  are  familiar  to most people  as political  slogans used  by  governments  and 
interest  groups  to  rationalize  or  promote  particular  government  policies  and  actions. 
Traditionally, although not exclusively,  the  focus of national  security has been concerned with 
external  defence  and  strategic  issues. Despite  this  common  usage,  however,  there  is  nothing 
inherent in the term that necessarily excludes a wider range of factors from being considered as 




“ambiguous  symbol” which  can  be deceptive  and  possibly meaningless when  employed  as  a 
policy  label.  Defining  security  as  a measure  of  “the  absence  of  threats  to  acquired  values,” 




values? How much  security? From what  threats? By what means? At what cost? And  in what 
time period?15 Although he acknowledges that not all specifications need be employed in every 
instance of analysis, Baldwin nevertheless asserts that at a minimum the specifications of “means, 
costs,  and  time  period must  be  specified…[f]or  purposes  of  systematic  comparison  of  policy 
alternatives.”16  The  point  being  made  is  that,  from  a  conceptual  perspective,  there  are 
opportunity costs involved in the provision of the value of national security, as well as potential 






and  the  consequent  implications  for  security  among  states. Although  states  are  not  the  only 
actors  in  the  international  system,  they  are  the  bodies  that  hold  primary  responsibility  for 
providing  security  to  their  respective  populations.  International  organizations  may  play 
supporting  roles  in  the  provision  of  security  to  various  communities  at  different  levels  of 
analysis, such as distributing food aid to famine victims, nation building in new states (such as 
East  Timor),  reconstruction  following  conflict  or  natural  disasters,  mitigating  the  effects  of 
financial  crises  or  protecting  against  future  environmental  catastrophes.  Yet  the  actions  of 
international  organizations  are  themselves  the  result  of  collective  actions  by  groups  of  states: 
                                                 
12 Rather too much has been made by some commentators of a perceived breakdown of the modern 
Westphalian state system and even of the looming death of the state itself. The system (and states) may be 
evolving, but that has always been the case: it has never consisted entirely of stereotypical unitary nation 
states, and rather has always included a diverse range of polities, encompassing all kinds of entities from 
vast multinational empires to tiny city states.  
13 See The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006. 
14 Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol” in Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: 
Essays on International Politics, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1965 (first pub. 
1962), pp. 147-150. 
15 David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, January 
1997, pp. 12-18. 
16 Ibid., p. 17. 
17 Wolfers, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,” p. 158. 
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international  organizations  are  not  sovereign  actors  in  the  international  system  and  are 
dependent upon a high degree of cooperation between states to function with any effectiveness. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the use of military force. Although states sometimes act 





any  central governing body  (as opposed  to  total  chaos).  In  the  absence of world government, 
therefore, the state becomes the leading object of analysis in the system. Whilst system‐generated 
threats to “acquired values” may affect security at levels of analysis other than the state, the state 






most  familiar  in  discussions  of  national  or  international  security  and  hardly  require  detailed 
examination. Suffice  it  to say  that  the political and military dimensions have  traditionally been 
dominant factors in relations between polities and, therefore, for both national and international 
security. It is these very factors, though, that the alternative security and security studies schools 
of  thought  have  attempted  to  downplay,  instead  refocusing  on  so‐called  “non‐traditional” 
security issues. These schools pose a challenge for traditional thinking on security and thus also 
for  policymakers  and  agencies  in  the  national  security  business,  including  navies.  For  an 




The  societal  dimension  of  security,  according  to  Buzan,  includes  the  protection  of  national 
identity and culture. However, purely “national”  identity can be  threatened by minorities with 
separate ethnic or  religious  identities,  language or culture, while  internally weak states  in  turn 
often  persecute  such minority  groups  in  order  to maintain  national  “stability.”18  The  societal 
cohesion of states is also threatened by demographic factors such as rapid population growth in 
many  developing  countries  and  demographic  “bubbles,”  whereby  a  high  proportion  of  the 
population of a given state may be concentrated in certain age groups, requiring the diversion of 






malaria  and  HIV/AIDS,21  while  the  prospect  of  an  avian  influenza  pandemic  is  particularly 
daunting for the densely populated developing states of Asia, where the capacity to cope with an 
outbreak may be  limited. One further aspect of societal security  is the problem of refugees and 
                                                 
18 Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp. 122-123. 
19 Banister and Johnson, Human Dimensions of Asian Security, pp. 13-29. 
20 Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea Den Boer, “A Surplus of Men, a Deficit of Peace: Security and Sex 
Ratios in Asia’s Largest States,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4, Spring 2002, pp. 5-38. 
21 Alan Dupont, East Asia Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to Security, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2001, chap. 11; and Banister and Johnson, Human Dimensions of Asian Security, pp. 37-49. 
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illegal  migration,  which  can  cause  social  instability  in  the  destination  country  by  affecting 
employment  prospects  for  locals,  straining  social  services,  introducing  disease  and  increasing 
cultural,  ethnic  and  religious  diversity  and,  thus,  the  potential  for  conflict  between  local  and 






The  economic  dimension  of  security  can  readily  be  applied  to  all  levels  of  analysis,  often 
providing  linkages  between  the  different  levels.  For  example,  individual  security  will  be 








There  is  a  strong maritime  element  to  economic  security  in  the  Asia‐Pacific  region.  Seafood 
provides the primary source of protein for a large proportion of the region’s people and fishing is 
a major  industry,  increasingly under  threat  through depletion of  fish stocks and environmental 




three  leading  shipbuilding  states, with  China,  in  particular,  rapidly  emerging  as  the world’s 
largest shipbuilder26; whilst Asia also dominates the world’s ship‐breaking industry. Offshore oil 
and gas is an important aspect of both economic and national energy security for several coastal 







the  Communist  world  during  the  Cold  War,  relying  instead  on  intra‐bloc  trade  and  self‐
sufficiency. The traditional alternative to a liberal free‐trading international economic system is a 
mercantilist  (or  neo‐mercantilist)  one  in  which  states  seek  a  high  degree  of  economic  self‐
                                                 
22 Ibid., pp. 51-62. Internal migration, often state-sponsored (or even forced), can also threaten societal 
security. The former Soviet Union and Indonesia have both been dogged by difficulties caused by previous 
internal migration and forced resettlement policies, whilst China continues to alter the demographic balance 
in favour of ethnic Han Chinese in Tibet and the traditionally (Turkic) Muslim region of Xinjiang.  
23 Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp. 235-237. Buzan lists food, water, shelter and education as his basic 
human requirements.  
24 Dupont, East Asia Imperilled, pp. 101-103. 
25 Meryl J. Williams, Enmeshed: Australia and Southeast Asia’s Fisheries, Lowy Institute Paper 20, Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 2007, p. 27. 
26 See Gabriel Collins and Michael Grubb, “Strong Foundation: Contemporary Chinese Shipbuilding 
Prowess” in Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein and Carnes Lord, eds., China Goes to Sea: Maritime 
Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2009, pp. 
344-371. 




acceptance of  the  interdependence  inherent  in  liberal  systems), often  explicitly pursued  in  the 
name of “national security.”27 Mercantilist conceptions of economic security were followed in the 
seventeenth  century  by  the European maritime powers precisely  to  increase  the power  of  the 
state  and maximize  its military  potential  in  those  war‐prone  times.28  National  strategies  for 
pursuing economic security range from complete reliance on the global market to provide access 
to essential goods and technologies (and liberal norms and institutions to provide market access 
for  one’s  own  goods),  to  aggressive mercantilism  in  a world where  states  are  perpetually  in 
conflict and preparing for war.  
 
A system characterized by mercantilism will set  the  tone  for state behaviour, although  there  is 
some scope for individual states to follow an alternative course. Major Powers would find such 
an  alternative  course  of  action  difficult,  however, when  faced with  the  predatory  instincts  of 
other powers  inherent  in such a system. Conversely,  it  is easier  for states  to  follow alternative 
economic  security policies  in  a  largely  liberal  system, whether by opting out of  the  system  to 
pursue  autarky, or by  adopting  a neo‐mercantilist  strategy  (as  allegedly  favoured by  Japan).29 
China  can be viewed  as more obviously neo‐mercantilist  in  intent, particularly with  regard  to 
access  to  resources.  Seemingly  unwilling  to  rely  on  the  market  alone,  China  is  intent  on 
monopolizing as much supply as possible. As part of  this  thinking on  resource security, many 
Chinese  strategists  have  advocated  the  expansion  of  China’s  national  tanker  fleet  to  reduce 
dependence  on  foreign  shipping;  thus  ensuring  that  China’s  oil  imports  could  be  carried  in 
Chinese owned and  flagged  ships, and also potentially protected  in  the  future by  the Chinese 
navy.30 
 
A  common perception  following  the  end of  the Cold War was  that  the  relative  importance of 
economic  means  was  rising  vis‐à‐vis  military‐strategic  ones,  reflected  in  Edward  Luttwak’s 
assertion that “the methods of commerce are displacing military methods.”31 The statement was 
made  at  a  time  of  increasing  concern  amongst  American  analysts  of  U.S.  relative  economic 
decline,  a  growing  trade  deficit  and  an  increasingly  politicized  competition  for  international 
leadership  in  the  development  of  new  technologies.  Perceptions  of  decline  have  predictably 
resurfaced in the wake of America’s current economic and strategic difficulties.32  
                                                 
27 Buzan, People, States and Fear, pp. 243-246. 
28 See Edward Mead Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations 
of Military Power” in Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1943, esp. pp. 117-120. 
29 Japan’s post-War foreign policy has been described as one of “mercantile realism” by Eric Heginbotham 
and Richard J. Samuels, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy” in Ethan B. Kapstein and 
Michael Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1999. 
30 See Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, “Beijing’s Energy Security Strategy: The Significance of a 
Chinese State-owned Tanker Fleet,” Orbis, Vol. 51, No. 4, Fall 2007, pp. 665-684. 
31 Edward N. Luttwak, “From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics,” The National Interest, No. 20, Summer 
1990, p. 17.  
32 Prominent examples of the “declinist” school include Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great 
Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Random House, New York, 1987; 
Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Strategic Implications of Relative Economic Decline,” Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 104, No. 3, Fall 1989; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1981. For post-9/11, Iraq War influenced predictions of American decline, 
see Robert D. Kaplan, “America’s Elegant Decline,” The Atlantic Monthly, November 2007, pp. 104-116; 
and Pierre Hassner, “The Fate of a Century,” The American Interest, Vol. II, No. 6, July/August 2007, pp. 
36-47. For an even more wide-ranging prediction of the relative decline of the West as a civilization vis-à-
vis the major non-Western civilizations, see Coral Bell, The End of the Vasco da Gama Era: The Next 
Landscape of World Politics, Lowy Institute Paper 21, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, 
2007; and also Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, The 
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Relative  power  considerations  for  major  powers  creates  a  difficulty  of  disentangling  purely 
economic  considerations  from military  and  “power”  factors when  dealing with  the  economic 
security of the state. This can lead to the adoption of neo‐mercantilist type policy options such as 
a more  nationalistic  approach  to  trade  issues,  including  so‐called  “managed  trade,”  domestic 
subsidies  in  the  form  of  industry  policy  –  a  common  feature  of  national  naval  shipbuilding 
industries, for example – and,  in the realm of the high technology sector, strategic trade policy. 
The  difficulty with  pursuing  a  neo‐mercantilist  agenda  follows  from  the  fact  that  policies  to 
maintain or increase the relative power position of the state tend to contradict policies seeking to 
maximize  national wealth.  In  other words,  policymakers must  decide whether  the  economic 
security of the state  is best served by the accumulation of (relative) power or the pursuit of the 
highest  attainable  standard  of  living.33  In  practice,  however, most  states  depend  upon more 




From  a  purely  economic  standpoint,  the  notion  that  states  compete  economically  (or  “geo‐
economically”)  in  a  similar  fashion  to  businesses  has  been  assailed  by  the  economist  Paul 
Krugman, who suggests  that  the metaphor of national competitiveness  is both misleading and 
economically  damaging.35 Krugman,  however,  fails  to  take  into  account  the  national  security 
implications of economic policy, particularly when national security is viewed in the traditional 
manner of relative power and  the physical safety of  the state.  It  is often documented  that even 
Adam Smith,  the prototypical  liberal economic  theorist,  recognized  the primary  importance of 
military  power  and  security  to  the  defence  of  the  realm  and  supported  state  economic 
intervention  in  the  specific  areas  of  the  Navigation  Acts,  protection  of  fisheries  and  the 
stockpiling of  (and  the monopoly of  trade  in) naval stores produced  in  the American colonies. 
Smith  acknowledged  that  the  rationale  for  doing  so  was  primarily  for  defence  rather  than 
commercial gain:  each of  the measures  augmented  the  strength of  the Royal Navy  and, more 
generally,  the maritime  power  that  Britain’s  security  depended  upon  and which,  ultimately, 
provided  the  means  for  colonial  economic  expansion.36  Smith  thus  accepted  that,  “when 
necessary, the economic power of the nation should be cultivated and used as an instrument of 
statecraft.”37  In  contemporary  circumstances,  however,  the  “national  security”  slogan  can  be 
useful  to  rationalize  interventionist  economic measures, particularly  those designed  to  restrict 
free trade, even if either the measures or the rationale may be spurious.38 Once again, one must 
                                                                                                                                                 
Free Press, London, 2002 (first pub. 1997), chap. 12. An optimistic counter argument to the idea of 
America’s imminent decline is made in Walter Russell Mead, God and Gold: Britain, America, and the 
Making of the Modern World, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2007, pp. 346-359. 
33 For extended discussions on the policy options available and the dilemmas faced by the state in the 
pursuit of economic security within a competitive international system, see Theodore H. Moran’s review 
article, “Grand Strategy: The Pursuit of Power and the Pursuit of Plenty,” International Organization, Vol. 
50, No. 1, Winter 1996; and James R. Golden, “Economics and National Strategy: Convergence, Global 
Networks, and Cooperative Competition,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 3, Summer 1993. 
34 Michael Mastanduno contends, for example, that following the end of the Cold War the United States 
pursued conflicting national security and foreign economic policies. See Mastanduno, “Preserving the 
Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War” in Kapstein and 
Mastanduno, Unipolar Politics. 
35 Paul Krugman, “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 2, 
March/April 1994. 
36 See Moran, “Grand Strategy,” p. 181; and, especially, Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, 
Friedrich List,” pp. 121-124. 
37 Ibid., p. 124. 
38 For example, farming lobbies and their political supporters in the United States and elsewhere often 
promote and defend agricultural subsidies and trade protection by invoking the idea of national  “food 
security.”  
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Environmental  security  has  been  the  subject  of  an  increasing  body  of  literature  since  the  late 
1980s. The  objective  of  the  environment  and  security  literature has  been  to  stress  the need  to 
“redefine  security”  to  take  into account environmental  threats  to  individual, national,  regional 
and  global well‐being,  as  well  as  to  suggest  linkages  between  environmental  problems  and 
violent  conflict.39  Heightened  awareness  of  the  fragility  of  the  natural  environment  and  the 
growing dangers of interconnected environmental problems on a potentially global scale, such as 




the  proponents  of  environmental  security,  as  leading  elements  in  the  overall  conception  of 
“security”  in a world now perceived by some  to be more at risk  from environmental problems 
than from conventional war.40  
 
One of  the  first  formal  statements of  the  idea of  environmental  security was  the  report of  the 
United Nations‐established, independent World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED), Our Common  Future.  The  1987 WCED  report  focused  on  the  necessity  for  economic 













particular.44  Such  a  perspective,  however,  “tends  to  transform  environmental  security  into 
security for the environment per se,”45 as distinguished from a focus of the environmental impacts 
upon Buzan’s different  levels of analysis. As with arms  race  theory,  this preoccupation also  is 
lacking in political or strategic context: no attempt is made to balance the negative environmental 
                                                 
39 For an early example see Richard Ullman,  “Redefining Security,” International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1, 
1983. For a brief history of the environmental security movement see Jon Barnett, “Environmental 
Security” in Collins, Contemporary Security Studies, pp. 184-188. 
40 See, for example, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2, 
Spring 1989; Gwyn Prins, ed., Threats without Enemies: Facing Environmental Insecurity, Earthscan, 
London, 1993; and Gwyn Prins and Robbie Stamp, Top Guns and Toxic Whales: The Environment and 
Global Security, Earthscan, London, 1991.  
41 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1987, p. 290. 
42 Ibid., chap. 10. 
43 Ibid., pp. 294-304. 
44 Barnett, “Environmental Security,” pp. 195-196. 
45 Terriff et al., Security Studies Today, p. 130. 








to  dangers  of  falling  agricultural  output  and  subsequent  economic  decline  or  hardship  and 
displacement of population, which in turn may produce high levels of social disruption leading 
to  violent  conflict. Widespread  sub‐national  violence may  also  lead  to  the  spread  of  conflicts 
across  borders,  especially  if  the  environmental  problems  are  transnational  in  character.46  In 
particular, population growth coupled with  the depletion of renewable resources such as  fresh 
water,  arable  land,  forests  and  marine  fisheries,  could  produce  scarcity‐induced  conflicts, 
especially  if access  to, or distribution of,  those  resources  is unequal.47  It has been asserted  that 




of  conventional war  due  to  their  strategic  implications,  environmental  analysts  often  tend  to 
focus on renewable resources.  In   part  this  is due  to the nature of renewable resources as basic 
human  requirements  for  existence  that  can  not  easily  be  replaced  by  substitutes when  they 
become  scarce,  and  also  their  susceptibility  to  environmental  degradation:  some  “renewable” 
resources  may  in  fact  run  out  in  certain  regions  through  over‐exploitation,  inadvertent 
destruction,50 or as an impact of global climate change. Nevertheless, the rapid economic growth 
of China and India, in particular, have not only focused attention on the domestic environmental 




Deudney  has  outlined  three  arguments  against  linking  environmental  factors  and  national 
security.  Firstly,  Deudney  argues  that  the  traditional,  inter‐state  violence  focus  of  national 
security has no substantial features in common with the problem of environmental degradation. 
Secondly, the short‐term, selfish relative gains considerations of individual states endemic in the 
mindsets  and  institutional  processes  of  national  security  policymaking  are  inappropriate  and 
possibly counter‐productive to the approach required to mitigate environmental hazards, which 




                                                 
46 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,” 
International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2, Fall 1991, esp. pp. 90-98. See also Robert D. Kaplan, The Ends of 
the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century, Papermac, London, 1997 (first pub. 1996); and Paul 
F. Diehl and Nils Petter Gleditsch, eds., Environmental Conflict, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 2001. 
47 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” 
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer 1994, pp. 5-40. 
48 See Alan Dupont, The Environment and Security in Pacific Asia, Adelphi Paper 319, Oxford University 
Press for the IISS, London, June 1998; and Dupont, East Asia Imperilled, chaps. 2-6. 
49 Alan Dupont, “Maritime Environmental Security” in David Wilson and Dick Sherwood, eds., Oceans 
Governance and Maritime Strategy, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 2000, pp. 129-138. 
50 Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict,” pp. 8-9 & 18-19; and Mathews, 
“Redefining Security,” p. 164. 
51 Daniel Deudney, “The Case against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1990, pp. 461-476.  




argues  that whilst ozone depletion and global  climate  change,  for  example, may  justifiably be 
classed as “threats” to national security there  is no benefit in doing so. Rather, he suggests that 
the national security decision‐making apparatus is inappropriate for dealing with environmental 
dangers  and  that  environmental  agencies  are,  logically  enough,  the  best  suited  for  that  task, 
unhindered by  the “high politics” considerations  inherent  in national security planning.52 Levy 
also questions  the  linking of environmental degradation  to violent  conflict,  instead  identifying 
the indirect nature of the impact of environmental damage on international security: the dangers 
to  international  security  result  instead  from  the  political  consequences  of  environmental 
degradation, not  from degradation  itself. Therefore, when violent  conflict  supposedly derived 
from  environmental  factors occurs, “so many  intervening variables have been  added  that  it  is 
difficult  to see  the  independent contribution of environmental degradation. There appear  to be 
no interesting mechanisms that are purely and discretely environmental.”53 
 
In  the  absence  of  strong  empirical  evidence  to  support  Homer‐Dixon’s  contentions  that 
environmental  degradation  and  scarcity  will  lead  directly  to  violent  conflict,  more  recent 
critiques  have  suggested,  for  example,  that  environmental  security  should  be  viewed  in  the 
human  security  terms  of  the  vulnerabilities  of  specific  populations  to  environmental  stress, 
including climate change, especially in the developing world.54 Levy’s solution is to concentrate 
research on the causes of regional conflict rather than only on the environmental connections to 
conflict.55 Unfortunately,  a  research  agenda  studying  the  causes of wars  itself  is  likely  to be  a 
somewhat  endless  (and  possibly  also  meaningless)  exercise  and  the  progenitor  of  countless 
competing  theories:  every  war  inevitably  is  in  some  detail,  great  or minor,  including  in  its 
underlying or immediate causes, unique from all other wars.56 
 
Levy’s  overarching  argument  against  linking  the  environment  and  security,  however,  is  that 
those  commentators who attempt  to  redefine  security  to  include environmental  factors  simply 
because environmental “threats” are in of themselves important – which he terms the “existential 
view” – are only using the language of security to create a higher public profile and thus win a 
higher priority  for  their chosen cause  from policymakers. As Levy aptly states, “the existential 
view … has no basis  except as a  rhetorical device aimed at drumming up greater  support  for 
measures to protect the environment.” And, “it is an effort to raid the security issue in order to 
reap some of the deference that [supporters of the idea] believe politicians and publics pay to it.” 
Such  efforts, moreover,  are based upon  “an  intellectually  flimsy  set of  slogans.”57 Once  again, 




as  the  extent of  environmental destruction has become more widely  accepted,  as  the negative 
environmental  impact of rising economic giants becomes more evident and, most  important, as 
climate  change has become a  leading  issue both  for  international diplomacy and  in  the public 
                                                 
52 Marc A. Levy, “Is the Environment a National Security Issue?” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2, 
Fall 1995, pp. 46-54. 
53 Ibid., p. 58. 
54 Simon Dalby, “Security and Environment Linkages Revisited” in Hans Günter Brauch et al., eds., 
Globalisation and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualising Security in the 21st Century, Springer-
Verlag, Berlin, 2006.     
55 Levy, “Is the Environment a National Security Issue?” pp. 54-60. 
56 See Colin S. Gray, Villains, Victims and Sheriffs: Strategic Studies and Security for an Inter-War Period. 
An Inaugural Lecture, University of Hull Press, Hull, 1994, pp. 7-8; and Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, 
Macmillan, New York, 1973, chap. 7. 
57 Levy, “Is the Environment a National Security Issue?” pp. 36 & 41-46. 
CSS Discussion Paper 07/09           15 
 
 
consciousness.  The  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change,  for  example,  issued  its 
authoritative  and  highly  publicized  Fourth Assessment Report  in  2007,  detailing  the  impacts, 
risks  and  vulnerabilities  involved  with  what  is  now  the  scientific,  and  increasingly  widely 
politically accepted,  consensus on global warming.58 There  is also a growing  literature dealing 
with  the  potential  security  implications  of  climate  change.59 Despite  these  concerns,  however, 
there  remains much  to  commend  in Levy’s  arguments. Thus,  the potential  social  and political 
consequences  of  climate  change may  be more  important  considerations  for  national  security 
policymakers and agencies than the environmental effects themselves. Interestingly, and perhaps 
hypocritically, environmental security advocates have nothing at all to say about perhaps the two 
most  dangerous  environmental  threats  of  all:  an  asteroid  strike  or  a  stupendously  large 
geological  event,  such  as  a  “super  volcanic”  eruption.  Either  of  these  events,  which  are 
statistically inevitable, would cause catastrophic damage and loss of life, potentially even to the 
extent of being a widespread extinction event as has occurred in the past. Unlike global warming, 
moreover, with  its many  scientific  uncertainties,  the  consequences  of  an  eruption  of  a  super 






as  different  forms  of  security  and  reflect  the  current  fad  of  stressing  security’s 
multidimensionality. Enthusiasm  for alternative “concepts,”  though, was quite prevalent  in  the 
debate  over  East  Asian  regional  security  in  the  early  post‐Cold War  period.  The  alternative 













nuclear  war  required  efforts  to  “promote  our  security  in  common.”60  Based  on  a  working 
assumption that weapons (particularly nuclear weapons) posed the primary threat to peace, the 
Commission asserted six principles of common security, reproduced in the box below.61  
                                                 
58 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, esp. chaps. 19-20 and, for 
regional impacts, chaps. 9-16. 
59 See, for example, from Australian and American perspectives, respectively, Alan Dupont and Graeme 
Pearman, Heating Up the Planet: Climate Change and Security, Lowy Institute Paper 12, Lowy Institute 
for International Policy, Sydney, 2006; and National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, The CNA 
Corporation, Alexandria, VA, 2007.  
60 The Palme Commission, Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament, The Report of the 
Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme, Pan, 
London, 1982, p. 12. 
61 Ibid., pp. 8-11. 













































                                                 
62 Barry Buzan, “Common Security, Non-provocative Defence, and the Future of Western Europe,” Review 
of International Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4, October 1987, p. 267. 
63 Ibid., p. 271. 
64 See Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, “The Maritime Strategy,” supplement to U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, January 1986, pp. 2-17; and John F. Lehman, “The 600-Ship Navy,” in ibid., pp. 30-40. 
65 Buzan, “Common Security, Non-provocative Defence, and the Future of Western Europe”; and see also 
the discussion on “defensiveness” in Geoffrey Wiseman, “Common Security in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 
The Pacific Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1992, pp. 48-49. 
66 The intellectual underpinning for security dilemma and offence-defence theory was constructed by 










































                                                                                                                                                 
pp. 167-214. See also Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 
1, October 1997, pp. 171-201; and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics,” 
Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4, Summer 1995, pp. 660-691.  
67 Pauline Kerr, Andrew Mack and Paul Evans, “The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific” in 
Andrew Mack and John Ravenhill, eds., Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in 
the Asia-Pacific Region, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 1994, pp. 245-251; and Wiseman, 
“Common Security in the Asia-Pacific Region,” pp. 48-51 & 56-57. A powerful critique of the assumption 
that weapons can be categorized as either “offensive” or “defensive” is provided in Colin S. Gray, Weapons 
Don’t Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military Technology, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 
1993, esp. chap. 2 (“Offensive and Defensive Weapons?”).   
68 Wiseman, “Common Security in the Asia-Pacific Region,” p. 50. 
69 See, for example, Andrew Bennett and Joseph Lepgold, “Reinventing Collective Security after the Cold 
War and Gulf Conflict,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 108, No. 2, Summer 1993. 
70 Although sanctioned by the United Nations, as in the Korean War the action was conceived, led and 
primarily executed by the United States, thus representing more a case of collective defence by an ad hoc 
American-constructed coalition than a genuine case of collective security. For an extended discussion on 
the distinction between collective security and collective defence, see Arnold Wolfers, “Collective Security 
and the War in Korea” and “Collective Defense versus Collective Security” in Wolfers, Discord and 
Collaboration. 
71 On collective security’s demanding requirements, see Inis J. Claude, Swords into Plowshares: The 
Problems and Progress of International Organization, 3rd ed., University of London Press, London, 1965 
(3rd ed. first pub. 1964), chap. 12, esp. pp. 234-238 (quote from p. 235).  
72 The classic critique is Wolfers, “Collective Defense versus Collective Security.” The best contemporary 
treatment is Richard K. Betts, “Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, 
and the New Europe,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1, Summer 1992, especially pp. 15-22. See also 
Josef Joffe, “Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends,” Survival, Vol. 
34, No. 1, Spring 1992, pp. 36-50; Mark T. Clark, “The Trouble with Collective Security,” Orbis, Vol. 39, 






concert‐based  collective  security  system would  rely  upon  “a  small  group  of major  powers  to 
guide  the  operation  of  a  region‐wide  security  structure.”  A  concert  would,  according  to  its 
proponents,  capture  “the  advantages  offered  by  collective  security” while  also  reflecting  the 
extant “power realities.”74 However, the notion of a concert would require the creation of a two‐
class  security  system,  where  the  importance  of  maintaining  positive,  cooperative  security 
relationships between the major powers overrides the rights and  interests of other states. Intra‐
concert  balances  of  power  would  also  remain  a  feature  of  such  a  system.75  Whilst  these 
characteristics  may  simply  be  reflecting  the  “normal”  world  of  international  politics,  they 
nevertheless  tend  to negate  those  features of  collective  security  that make  the  concept distinct 
from  the more  traditional  types of  security  systems  it  is  supposed  to  replace.  In  the words of 
Richard  Betts,  such  ideas  “recognize  the  defects  in  the  Wilsonian  ideal  type  [of  collective 
security],  and  they may  reassure  the  great  powers  about  their  security,  but  they  de‐collectivize 
collective security.”76 
 
In  East  Asia,  quite  apart  from  its  questionable  theoretical  underpinnings  and  the  lack  of 
supporting  empirical  evidence  to  demonstrate  its  practicability,  the  development  of  collective 
security also would  face difficulties arising  from  the relative  lack of “integrative organizational 






security  into  an  overarching  concept.  Security  in  this  view,  therefore, must  take  into  account 
individuals and sub‐state communities as well as national, regional and  international concerns, 
including  the  linkages  between  domestic  and  external  security,  and  all  the  various  forms  of 
security  covered  in  the  earlier  discussion,  although  the  non‐military  factors  tend  to  be 
emphasized  at  the  expense  of  traditional  conceptions  of  national  security  focused  on  external 
defence.79 However, despite widespread usage  throughout East Asia,  the  idea has  tended  to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
No. 2, Spring 1995, pp. 237-258; and John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International 
Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1994/95, pp. 26-37. 
73 Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,” 
International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1, Summer 1991, pp. 114-161. 
74 Ibid., p. 116. 
75 Betts, “Systems for Peace or Causes of War?” p. 27. 
76 Ibid., p. 21 (emphasis added). 
77 Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War,” 
International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3, Winter 1993/94, p. 73. On the lack of established international 
institutions and organizations compared to Europe, see Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, “Rethinking East 
Asian Security,” Survival, Vol. 36, No. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 15-16. 
78 Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability,” p. 71; and Douglas T. Stuart, “Toward Concert in Asia,” Asian 
Survey, Vol. XXXVII, No. 3, March 1997. 
79 For a concise overview of the idea, see Joe Camilleri, “The Pacific House: The Emerging Architecture 
for Comprehensive Security” in David Dickens, ed., No Better Alternative: Towards Comprehensive and 
Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 
Wellington, 1997, pp. 79-84.  
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partly as a way of defining a more prominent role  in  the world  for an  increasingly prosperous 
Japan whilst,  at  the  same  time,  downplaying  the  role  of military  factors  to  assuage  regional 
sensitivities over Japan’s militarist past. The concept also served to highlight the vulnerability of 
the Japanese economy to various forms of disruption and sought, therefore, to build a regionally 
acceptable policy  to  safeguard  its vital  economic  interests.81 The  Japanese  conception  covers  a 
broad  range  of  threats,  both  internal  and  external,  covering  vital  national  interests  such  as 
economic  prosperity  and  viability,  political  stability,  strategic  relationships with  other major 
powers  (especially  the  United  States  –  Japan’s  ally‐protector)  and  territorial  integrity,  and 
specifically  includes  natural  disasters  such  as  earthquakes  within  its  remit.82  Although  non‐
military means  and  “defensive” defence were  stressed  (in  keeping with  Japan’s  constitutional 
restrictions  on  the  use  of military  force),83  the  concept  has  nevertheless  been  criticized  as  a 










its  defence  responsibilities  not  only  to  other  regional  states,  but  also  to  a  sceptical  domestic 
constituency. 
 
The  originality  of  taking  a  multidimensional  view  of  national  security  with  a  concomitant 
emphasis on using a variety of means (such as diplomatic, economic and military instruments) to 
protect  that  security,  however,  is  vastly  overstated.  The  specifically  Japanese  concern  with 
earthquakes  aside,  it  is  not  clear  how  the  Japanese  concept  of  comprehensive  security differs 
greatly,  in  principle,  from  the  more  traditional  idea  of  grand  strategy  (or  national  security 
strategy). Grand strategy has been defined as “the art of employing all of the relevant assets of a 
                                                 
80 Jim Rolfe, “Regional Comprehensive Security: Some Problems of Definition and Application” in Rolfe, 
ed., Unresolved Futures: Comprehensive Security in the Asia-Pacific, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria 
University of Wellington, Wellington, 1995, p. 84. 
81 David Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
1994, p. 2. 
82 Yoshinobu Yamamoto, “A Framework for a Comprehensive-Cooperative Security System for the Asia-
Pacific” in Rolfe, Unresolved Futures, p. 18. This conception is to a certain extent similar to Ullman’s 
“redefinition” of security, noted earlier: see Ullman, “Redefining Security.”  
83 Yamamoto, “A Framework for a Comprehensive-Cooperative Security System for the Asia-Pacific,” p. 
19. 
84 See Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” p. 3. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Yamamoto, “A Framework for a Comprehensive-Cooperative Security System for the Asia-Pacific,” p. 
18. Economic security has been a central concern of Japanese national policy for “over 100 years,” 
according to Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, and 
Policies,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, p. 98. 
87 Peter J. Woolley and Mark S. Woolley, “The Kata of Japan’s Naval Forces,” Naval War College Review, 
Vol. XLIX, No. 2, Spring 1996, pp. 63-64; and Katzenstein and Okawara, “Japan’s National Security,” pp. 
112-113. 
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country  for  the political purposes  set by high policy.”88 Perhaps  in  the  Japanese  context,  then, 
comprehensive security might best be viewed as “grand strategy with Japanese characteristics,” 





based  around  the  concept  of  “national  resilience”  which,  unlike  the  Japanese  variety  of 
comprehensive security, focused thinking about national security mostly on internal matters such 
as  political  and  social  stability,  regime  security,  economic  development  and  nation‐building 
activities. In so doing, Suharto was refocusing national effort on improving domestic stability, in 
part  by  avoiding  the  type  of  conflicts  with  other  regional  states  that  had  characterized  the 
previous Sukarno era.89  
 
Following  logically  from national resilience  is  the  idea  that  if all ASEAN states were  to pursue 
policies of national stability through national resilience, then the result would be one of “regional 
resilience,” thus explicitly linking domestic and regional stability. Indonesia’s policy of regional 
resilience,  therefore,  played  a  role  in  developing mutual  confidence  and  cohesion within  the 
ASEAN grouping during the 1970s,90 especially given that Indonesia itself had previously posed 
a threat to  its neighbours. During the post‐Sukarno period the  idea may have had considerable 
merit within  the ASEAN context, as  the most pressing  threats  to  the security of ASEAN states 
tended  to  be  internal,  such  as  those  challenges  posed  by  domestic  insurgencies  or  the  not 
insignificant burdens of economic and social development. It should also be noted, though, that 
the  regional element of  Indonesia’s Wawasan Nusantara concept  flagged  Jakarta’s  intent  to be a 
leading player, perhaps the pre‐eminent power, in Southeast Asia.91 
 
With  rapid economic development and an  increasing dependence on  trade, growing sovereign 
rights at sea and a concomitant demand for marine resource protection following agreement of 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982, however, as well as the end of the Cold War 
and decline  in  the number and  intensity of Southeast Asia’s  insurgencies,  the security  focus of 
many states of the enlarged ASEAN no longer focused exclusively, or even necessarily primarily, 







Cooperation  in  the  Asia  Pacific  (CSCAP),  has  attempted  to  better  define  the  idea  of 
comprehensive  security.  The  CSCAP  Working  Group  on  Comprehensive  and  Cooperative 
Security produced a memorandum which defines the concept in the following terms: 
 
                                                 
88 Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century, Touchstone, New 
York, 1991 (first pub. 1990), p. 29. See also Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, 
Belknap Harvard, Cambridge, MA, 1987, pp. 179-181; and Paul Kennedy, “Grand Strategy in War and 
Peace: Toward a Broader Definition” in Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in War and Peace, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, CT, 1991.  
89 Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” p. 3. 
90 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
91 Dino Patti Djalal, The Geopolitics of Indonesia’s Maritime Territorial Policy, Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies, Jakarta, 1996, esp. pp. 112-115. 
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Comprehensive  security  is  the  pursuit  of  sustainable  security  in  all  fields 






multifaceted  and  multidimensional  in  character.  Ultimately  security 
encompasses  the  security  of  all  the  fundamental  needs,  core  values  and  vital 
interests of the individual and society in every field [:] economic, social, political, 
cultural,  environmental  and  military.  Any  significant  threat  to  the 
comprehensive well‐being of man,  society  and  state, whether  emanating  from 
external sources or from within a state, is deemed a threat to security.93 
 















The CSCAP definition explicitly attempts  to combine aspects of both  the  Japanese and ASEAN 
conceptions  of  comprehensive  security  with  the  ideas  of  common  security  and  cooperative 
security, in order to produce an “over‐arching organising concept for the management of security 
in  the  region.”95  Just  how  one  “manages”  anything  quite  as  existential  as  “security,” 
comprehensively defined, though, is not explained. It further states that comprehensive security 
“can  only  be  attained  through  cooperation  based  on  common  interests.”96  Yet  this  sets  an 
unrealistically high standard  for  the realization of a regional security system based around  the 
comprehensive  concept,  as  the  national  interests  of  states  are  often  in  conflict  rather  than 
commonly  shared. The memorandum also emphasizes non‐military  factors over military ones, 
although in a contradictory manner also strongly favours arms control and military transparency, 
and  states  that  regional  alliance  systems  “are  a diminished option  for  comprehensive  security 
management in the region,” placing particular stress on the development of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum  (ARF)  for  the  implementation  of  comprehensive  security  on  a  regional  basis.97 This  in 
                                                 
92 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, “The Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative 
Security,” CSCAP Memorandum No. 3, reprinted in Dickens, No Better Alternative, p. 163 (emphasis 
removed). 
93 Ibid., p. 164. 
94 Ibid., pp. 164-167. 
95 Ibid., pp. 162-163. 
96 Ibid., p. 163. 


















questions  over  the  utility  of  its  regional  application:  in  particular,  “how  a  region  may  be 
threatened? … must the idea of regional security encompass some idea of ‘regional entity’ which 
can be physically destroyed?”98 Quite  clearly, a  region  is not an “entity”  in  its own  right and, 
therefore, cannot itself be threatened. Regional peace or stability may be threatened, but only in 












“security”  meaningless  as  a  distinct  idea.99  One  could  probably  make  the  case  that  most 
responsibilities  of  government  can  be  treated  as  security  issues  if  individual or national well‐
being  is  to be affected  to any significant degree. Moreover,  to do so would hardly aid national 







and  stability.  This  a  point worth  highlighting:  as much  as  non‐traditional  aspects  of  security 
deserve (and need) to be taken seriously, one ought not lose sight of the fact that the most dire of 
threats to states and the individuals resident therein generally remain those of war and strategic 




By  turning  all  aspects  of  well‐being  into  comprehensively  defined  problems  of  security, 
moreover,  everyday  inter‐state  disputes  risk  unnecessary  intensification  if  those  disputes  are 
viewed in security terms.100 This point may be viewed as analogous to Levy’s arguments, noted 
above, against addressing environmental problems through the policy prism of security: thus, by 




                                                 
98 Rolfe, “Regional Comprehensive Security,” p. 94. 
99 Lawrence Freedman, “International Security: Changing Targets,” Foreign Policy, No. 110, Spring 1998, 
p. 53. 
100 Rolfe, “Regional Comprehensive Security,” p. 101. 




thought of  in security  terms. Take  the possibility of an avian  influenza pandemic,  for example, 
which  perhaps  poses  the  greatest  immediate,  and  globally widespread,  threat  to  human  life: 
literally millions could die. Clearly, such an event would affect  the security of  individuals and 
states, and perhaps also entire  regions; but  is  it useful  to  think of a pandemic  in  those  terms? 




and,  internationally,  the World Health Organization. Defence  forces might  be  required  to  be 
involved  in  dispensing  aid  to  the  civil  authority,  undertaking  evacuation  operations  or 
humanitarian assistance missions overseas, or responding to security implications of a pandemic, 
such as political  instability and disorder  in regional states, or tightening protection of maritime 
borders. Yet once again  the analogy with  the environmental security debate  is useful:  there are 
likely  to  be  intervening  variables  between  a  pandemic  itself,  and  the  situations  requiring  a 
response from security forces, such as violent conflict. In other words, just because the threat of a 
pandemic  is  important  to well‐being, or even  to comprehensive “security,” does not mean  that 







Australia,  Joe  Clark  and  Gareth  Evans,  respectively,  and  well‐connected  academics  in  both 
countries. The  two  states,  in  a perhaps  competitive process of one‐upmanship  and basking  in 
their newly  self‐styled  status as “middle” powers, drove  the  cooperative  security agenda with 
seemingly  little  input  from  regional  states. Clark,  for  example,  launched  the  idea of  the  short‐
lived North  Pacific Cooperative  Security Dialogue  (NPCSD)  in  1990, whilst  in  the  same  year 
Evans  suggested  a  regional  version  of  Europe’s  formal,  institutionalized multilateral  security 
framework,  the Conference on Security and Cooperation  in Europe  (CSCE – now  the OSCE, or 
Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe): a Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Asia. The  latter project was quickly  rejected both by  the United States, which did not wish  its 
system  of  bilateral  alliances weakened,  and  regional  states, which were  suspicious  of  formal 




form  of  regional  security  dialogue.  The ASEAN  states  promoted  the ASEAN  Post‐Ministerial 
Conferences, a forum established to facilitate dialogue between the foreign ministers of ASEAN 
and  those  invited  from other states,  thus allowing ASEAN  to control  the pace and direction of 
developments.  This  process  led  directly  to  the  founding  of  the ARF  in  July  1993,  one month 
following  the  establishment  of  CSCAP;  becoming,  respectively,  the  leading  official  and 
“unofficial” regional cooperative security dialogues,102 although it is now arguable whether that 
is still the case as cooperative security processes have flourished at both Track I and II levels to 
                                                 
101 For a summary of the original proposals see Kerr, Mack and Evans, “The Evolving Security Discourse 
in the Asia-Pacific,” pp. 236-239. 
102 Ibid., pp. 240-244; Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” pp. 5-7; and Michael 
Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, Adelphi Paper 302, Oxford University Press for the IISS, London, 
July 1996, pp. 21-30.  
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it must  be  geared  toward  reassurance,  rather  than deterrence;  it must  at  best 




War  security  structures with  new, multilateral  ones  possessing  the  above  characteristics. Yet, 
unlike  the  formalized  European  cooperative  security  structure  represented  primarily  by  the 
OSCE,  the  proponents  of  cooperative  security  structures  for  East  Asia  understood  that  a 
gradualist  approach  needed  to  be  taken,  therefore  “allowing multilateralism  to  develop  from 
more  ad  hoc,  informal,  and  flexible  processes  until  the  conditions  for  institutionalized 
multilateralism  become more  favourable.”104  It  has  been  suggested  by Desmond  Ball  that  the 
difficulties encountered  in establishing multilateral, cooperative structures  in  the  region can be 
explained  by  a  range  of  factors  summed  up,  collectively,  as  a  reputedly  distinct  East Asian 
strategic culture that, inter alia, favours bilateralism over multilateralism, and informal, pragmatic 
and consensual approaches to decision making.105 Ball also described the gradualist approach as 




A  further  characteristic  of  cooperative  security  is  a  requirement  for  inclusiveness: whilst  the 







this  regard.  Such  a  process  –  of  inclusive  multilateralism  for  its  own  sake  –  would  have 
represented  a  rather  pointless  case  of  form  dominating  function.  Indeed  it  is  impossible  to 
envision any region‐wide security system in Asia of any utility not dominated by at least one of 
the major powers: to do so would in fact encourage great power abstinence, dooming any such 
                                                 
103 Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” p. 7. See also Gareth Evans, 
Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, NSW, 
1993. 
104 Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” p. 7. 
105 Desmond Ball, Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region (With Some Implications for Regional 
Security Cooperation), SDSC Working Paper No. 270, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The 
Australian National University, Canberra, April 1993. 
106 Desmond Ball, Building Blocks for Regional Security: An Australian Perspective on Confidence and 
Security Building Measures (CSBMs) in the Asia/Pacific Region, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence 
No. 83, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1991, 
especially pp. 27-28. 
107 Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” p.10. 
108 Ibid., p. 8. 








Nonetheless,  the  elements  that  make  cooperative  security  a  potentially  more  practicable 
proposition than the previously discussed concepts include an acknowledgement of the “primacy 
of  state  interests”  and  the  acceptance  of  the  value  to  regional  stability  of  existing  bilateral 
alliances.109  There  is  a  considerable  degree  of  tension,  however,  between  these  practical 
considerations that might allow security multilateralism to grow under the protective umbrella of 




Dewitt’s  acknowledgement  that  the  idea  incorporates  “aspects  of  both  common  security  and 
comprehensive  security,”110  leads  to  the  criticism  that  it  is  “attempting  to  cover  all  the  bases 
without  risking offending anyone.”111 The concept of cooperative  security,  then,  suffers  from a 
degree  of  ambiguity  and,  in  common with  its  sister  concepts,  remains  somewhat  vague  and 
indistinct despite, or perhaps even because of, attempts at definition. Such a critique does not set 
out  to damn all attempts at  security multilateralism, which  increasingly  tend  to be  labelled as 
“cooperative security,” but only  to point out deficiencies  in  the concept  itself, as advertised, as 
the basis for a viable alternative security system. 
      
Dewitt  further muddies  the waters by  asserting  that  “any  attempt  to differentiate between … 




whole greater  than  the  sum of  their parts  that presents a viable alternative  to  traditional  state 




On  the one hand,  the  existing U.S.‐led  alliance  system predictably has not been  replaced; nor 
have  the  dynamics  of  regional  strategic  relations  been  significantly  influenced. On  the  other 








                                                 
109 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
110 Ibid., p. 10. 
111 Peter Lawler, “The Core Assumptions and Presumptions of ‘Cooperative Security’” in Stephanie 
Lawson, ed., The New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond, Allen & Unwin, St 
Leonards, NSW, 1995, p. 45. 
112 Dewitt, “Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security,” p. 1. 
113 See, for example, Chris Rahman, “The International Politics of Combating Piracy in Southeast Asia” in 
Peter Lehr, ed., Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, Routledge, New York, 2007, 
pp.184-189. 
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The  impact  of  globalization:  From  international  security  to  global 
security? 
 
Like  “security,”  “globalization”  has  become  such  a  ubiquitous  term  that  it  is  often  employed 
more as a slogan than a word of real meaning, and its meaning usually is ill‐defined, if at all. One 
could  do  far  worse  than  turn  to  Jan  Aart  Scholte’s  definition:  rejecting  internationalization, 
liberalization, universalization and Westernization as “redundant” arguments which fail to add 
any  new  insights  to  the  concept  of  globalization  not  already  available  “through  pre‐existent 
vocabulary,”114 he favours a spatial definition of globalization as the “spread of transplanetary … 
[or]  supraterritorial  …  connections  between  people.”115  Unlike  the  four  rejected  ideas,  this 
definition denotes a discontinuity  in the “underlying character of social geography”: “a shift  in 
the nature of social space.”116 At the very least, however, this conception can only lead one to the 
conclusion  that globalization  is a very  fragile phenomenon,  liable  to perhaps  terminal damage 
from a wide  range of potential disruptions  to  that global social connectivity. And  further,  that 
connectivity actually assists many of the very disruptive forces which could ultimately degrade 




and  that “insecurity,”  in  turn,  is  increasingly a phenomenon  shared both by  communities and 
humankind  in  general  that  takes  little  account  of  national  borders. Human  security  and  new 
ideas on how  to order human affairs on a global scale are at  the  forefront of  these concerns of 
“global security.” In the words of one of its foremost proponents, Ken Booth, “the major task for 
the post‐Cold War  era  is pre‐eminently  that of developing  ideas about global governance  that 
will recapture a sense of the future and of a concept of progress in the interests of human needs, 





injustice” and other problems attributed  to globalizing  liberal‐capitalism, human  rights abuses, 
ecological damage and  so  forth, which  together contribute  to a “global  insecurity community” 
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119 Booth, “Conclusion,” p. 342. 
120 See, for example, Rorden Wilkinson, ed., The Global Governance Reader, Routledge, London, 2005. 
121 See Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1983; Robert O. 
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and norms of  international behaviour on particular  issues pursued by cooperating  states – are 
thus  supposed  to  provide  “governance”  independently  of  the  sources  of  international  power. 
James Kurth  is  cruel  but  concise  in  his  assault  on  this  empirically  unsupported,  yet  popular, 
theory: “Regimes without regimens, norms without the normal behaviour of states, rules without 
rulers, procedures without prowess, above all, banalities without even  truisms –  it doesn’t get 
any worse  than  this.”123 And  like  the concept of comprehensive security, regime  theory  fails  to 
directly address issues of war and peace – the most important security problematique of all. 
 
Indeed,  the  idea  that  security  is  “global”  is,  to  say  the  least,  questionable  (although  the 
aforementioned  probability  of  an  asteroid  strike might  do  the  trick  as  a  genuinely  common 
threat).  It  is difficult enough conceptualizing and practising  security on a national,  regional or 
even  international basis,  let alone globally, across  supraterritorial  communities. As Colin Gray 
points out, it is unclear what exactly in the global context needs to be secured, who would secure 
it,  and  how  it  might  be  secured.124  Even  Scholte  acknowledges  that,  despite  the  growth  of 
“supraterritorial  connectivity,”  territoriality  remains  an  essential  characteristic  of  world 
politics.125 Thus, even  leaving aside  the  temptation  to  level simple accusations of “globaloney,” 
the underlying problems for global security advocates are that, although the world may consist of 
a single political system, it does not represent “a single political community,” and that the global 
security  concept  “has  been  totally divorced  from practicable  strategies  for  its  achievement.”126 
The  security  implications  of  a  globalizing  world,  then,  including  both  traditional  and  non‐




first, Great  Britain,  and,  since  1945,  the United  States. Demonstrating  an  explicitly Mahanian 




war.129  It  is  equally  important  that  the  maritime  system  be  defended  in  times  of  peace,  or 
situations which  lie  somehow  between war  and  peace,  such  as  the  current  era  of  countering 
global  insurgency.  It may  be  unpalatable  to  some,  but  the  security  of  the  system  itself  and 
security from major threats that may develop from within the system can only be afforded by the 
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source  of  international  power  able  and willing  to  do  so:  the United  States.130 Defence  of  this 
liberal maritime order,  including  its vital geopolitical and commercial elements,  thus  is perhaps 
the  real  security  imperative of  the  current  era of globalization.131 The new American maritime 
strategy should thus be viewed as a practical policy expression of this need.132 
                                                 
130 See Colin S. Gray, The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the New World Order, University Press of 
Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 2004. 
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On  the  other  hand,  each dimension  of  security  already discussed may  also  be  applied  to  the 
maritime environment, with each arguably possessing maritime elements. Similarly, each of the 
alternative security system “concepts” on offer may also be applied to the maritime sphere. It is 
thus  possible  to  speak,  for  example,  of  “marine  environmental  security,”  “comprehensive 
maritime security” or “cooperative maritime security,” and so on.  
  
Despite  the  overlaps,  though,  Buzan’s  dimensions  of  security  framework  does  not  neatly 
encompass the various  identifiable perspectives on maritime security. The existing  literature on 
maritime security has tended to focus on the characteristics of the sea and its varied uses, and the 





and  threats  to  the  good  order  on which  their  continued  contribution  to  human  development 
depends.”136  A  Dalhousie  University  study  defined  maritime  security  as  “a  process  of 
maintaining stability in the international system on, over, under and from the sea.” That may not 
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and other  illicit  activities. Countering  these  irregular  and  transnational  threats 









not disciplines –  there was not a single strategist, for example):  the  tone  that predominates  is a 
“Third Worldist” one that is implicitly opposed to the roles and dominance of the major maritime 
powers  and,  especially,  one  suspects,  to  the  United  States.  It  accentuates  the  “concept”  of 




the  concept  of  collective  security,  the  idea  of  “peaceful  uses”  and  “peaceful  purposes”  is 




the oceans, namely  that all peoples should benefit  from  their use. The concept 





Although  the report accepts  that  the “translation of the moral and ethical goal of peaceful uses 
into practical reality” faces problems of definition and  interpretation, potential conflict between 
peaceful uses  and  the  legitimate  security measures put  in  place  by  states,  and  the  lack  of  an 
enforcement  mechanism  for  such  norms,143  it  nevertheless  crosses  a  line  into  excessive 
normativeness  and  ill‐defined,  ideologically  charged  notions  such  as  international  equity  and 
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the  approaches  discussed  above.  Although  what  follows  is  largely  compatible  with  those 
conceptions,  the analysis  instead  identifies  five prisms  through which “maritime security”  in a 
















living  and non‐living marine  resources  at  the  forefront  of maritime  security  concerns. Marine 
environmental security may be viewed as a subset of environmental security and has a strong 
ecological bias, based on an understanding of the importance of a healthy ocean environment for 
the  quality  of  life  on  land  and  the  ocean’s  vital  role  in  regulating  the  global  climate.  This 
approach informed the 1987 WCED report and, more specifically, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 on the 
protection  of  the  oceans,  adopted  at  the  1992  UN  Conference  on  Environment  and 
Development,145 and the IWCO report. Even the U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Security, with 




on  human  existence,  development  and  security.  The  distinctiveness  and  referent  object  of  the 
environmental security perspective, on the other hand, remains the ocean  itself, rather than the 
direct or  indirect  implications  for man and his political  relationships. Stated another way,  this 
perspective may be seen as a kind of environmental fundamentalism, perhaps best summed up 
by the proposition that, instead of thinking in terms of freedom of the seas, we should rather be 
pursuing  “freedom  for  the  seas.”147  This  somewhat  “theological”  approach  to  “environmental 
idealism”  deems  “The  concept  of  the  ecosystem  [to  be]  the  only  logical  ‘unit’  of  ocean 
management.” Such a perspective runs the danger not only of disregarding objective science, but 
                                                 
144 See, for example, the discussion in Cath Wallace, “The Security of the Marine Environment” in Cozens, 
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for  functional  ocean  management  in  East  Asia  has  been  undermined  by  an  allegedly 
objectionable  triumvirate of “politics, expediency and strategic considerations.” The underlying 
basis  for  the  dissatisfaction  is  that  these  reasons  “have  nothing  to  do  with  preserving  and 
protecting the oceans, the marine environment and marine resources.”149 One might be tempted 
to  retort:  “welcome  to  the  real  world!”  Although  identification  of  such  a  fundamentalist 
perspective  may  run  the  risk  of  being  seen  to  be  erecting  a  straw  man  (or  perhaps,  more 
appropriately,  “thalassic man”),  the  environmental  approach  to maritime  security  does  often 
seem  to attempt  the  logically  impossible:  to  remove  the politics  from  the  international political 
sphere. In other words, environmental  issues, particularly transnational ones such as the health 
of  the marine  environment, do not  exist  in  a vacuum,  and  can  only  be  addressed  in  regional 




The  ocean  governance  approach  to maritime  security  also has  a  strong marine  environmental 
bias, but unlike  the  fundamentalist view  is placed  firmly within  the  international political and 
legal framework that sets the context for ocean management.151 At its heart lies the promotion of a 
“stable  maritime  regime”  based  on  LOSC  principles:152  upholding  and  implementing  the 
Convention is thus a central consideration of this approach. In keeping with the concept of global 
governance,  discussed  earlier,  ocean  governance  can  be  described  as  “the  creation  and 
implementation of  the  rules  and practices  to govern ocean uses  and users.”  In  the  absence of 
world government, the creation of such a regime requires that states consent to these rules and 
practices  through  negotiation.153  In  theory,  this management  approach  can  also  “provide  the 
means of resolving conflicts over access to and the enjoyment of the benefits of the oceans.”154 
 
Although  the Law of  the Sea Convention  lies at  the  centre of  the ocean governance approach, 
management  of  the  oceans  is  not  based  on  divinely  received  wisdom  to  be  worshipped 
unchangeably  for  all  time.  The Convention may  provide  some  degree  of  stability,  but  global 
ocean  governance  is  a  constantly  evolving  system,  including  but  not  limited  to  the  so‐called 
“thickening” of coastal state jurisdiction, especially in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ),155 and 
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regulation – both  in zones of national  jurisdiction and on  the high seas. The  IWCO report  thus 
also called  for  the reorientation of naval responsibilities  to a  law enforcement  focus  in order  to 
“make  the  oceans  safer  for  the  global  community.”  In  a  bout  of  unintended  irony,  the 
Commission evidently  sees no  inconsistency between  this perceived need and  its anti‐military 
bias.158 Such a new and expanded  focus  for navies  is similar  to  the arguments made by Gwyn 
Prins, who has called for navies to refocus their peacetime roles to those of becoming an “Ocean 
Guard”  for  improved ocean governance: policing  the global  commons  and  conducting marine 
environmental monitoring.159 
 
Ocean  governance  is  a  global  growth  industry  for  international  organizations,  governments, 
institutions  and non‐governmental  organizations  alike.  In  the Asia‐Pacific  region  a number  of 
institutions have been involved with promoting regional ocean governance, including, inter alia, 
the Council  for Security Cooperation  in  the Asia Pacific,160  the ARF, and  Japan’s Ocean Policy 
Research Foundation and,161 most notably, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum 
with  its  Seoul Oceans Declaration  and  Bali  Plan  of Action.162 Nevertheless,  the  IWCO  report 
lodged  the  complaint  that “the global community  still  lacks an effective  system of governance 
capable of ensuring  that  the oceans are used  for  the benefit of all and  in  the  interests of  future 
generations,”163  in  large part due  to a continuing  lack of  integration; nationally,  regionally and 
globally, and between those three levels of governance. Despite these qualms, however, the basis 
to  the  ocean management  approach  to maritime  security  is  the promotion,  strengthening  and 
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There  are  two  potential  problems,  though,  for  this  view  of maritime  security,  especially with 
regard  to  its  application  in  the  Asia‐Pacific  region.  First,  as  perceptively  outlined  by  Sam 
Bateman, the Law of the Sea Convention  
 
has  some  important  limitations  as  the  foundation  for  a  regional  maritime 
security regime for East Asia ... In part these are a consequence of the relatively 
complex  maritime  geography  of  the  region  with  its  numerous  islands, 
archipelagos and narrow shipping channels. However, the limitations also flow 
from  the  complexity of  [the LOSC]  itself,  its numerous  “built  in”  ambiguities, 





the  region, whether  based  on  territory,  resources,  boundaries,  and  recalcitrant  nationalism  or 
LOSC interpretations. Bateman further has added that  
 
The  region  seemingly  lacks  sufficient  common  interests  on  which  to  base  a 
regime and  in part because of  this;  there  is not a strong political  framework  to 
carry an effective regime forward.165 
 









Effective  ocean  governance  requires  not  only  regional  and  international  cooperation  but  also 
effective management  by  coastal  states  throughout  their  own  zones  of maritime  jurisdiction. 
Ensuring that sovereignty and sovereign rights at sea are reliably enforced has become a leading 
national  security  concern  for all  coastal  states, particularly  since  the  expansion of  coastal  state 
jurisdiction enshrined in the Law of the Sea Convention; and, in particular, the promulgation of 
the  regime  of  the  EEZ.  The  concept  of  the  archipelagic  state  also was  a  novel  aspect  of  the 
Convention, with particular national importance for Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as for 
regional and other  significant maritime user  states. To  some degree,  the  international political 
legitimacy  of  coastal  state  claims  to  the  full  range  of  maritime  zones  allowed  under  the 
Convention  depends  on  their  ability  to  enforce  that  jurisdiction  and  uphold  coastal  state 
responsibilities – especially conservation and protection of the marine environment – and to be 
seen to be doing so in an effective manner over time.  
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166 This point is expanded upon in Chris Rahman, “Linking Maritime Regimes to Regional Security: Some 
Caveats and Observations” in Bateman, Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region, pp. 81-96.  




Pressure  grew  steadily  on  coastal  states  in  the  post‐War  decades  to  claim  increasing  and 
exclusive  jurisdiction over adjacent sea areas,  leading  to a number of high profile disputes and 
crises,  particularly  over  access  to  fisheries. Once  the  EEZ  regime  had  been  agreed  and  states 
began to claim the maximum jurisdiction allowable of an exclusive economic zone stretching to a 
distance of 200 nautical miles seaward of territorial sea baselines,167 the enforcement problem for 
coastal states actually became more difficult rather  than easier, as states were  forced  to pay  far 
greater  attention  to,  and  expend  greater  resources  upon,  the  requirements  of  maritime 




technical difficulties of developing  and  exploiting many offshore oil  fields,  especially  those  in 
deep waters, undermined the economic viability of many potential offshore fields, but now with 
renewed high oil prices driven by the dynamism of new economic giants and political instability 
in  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  rapidly  growing  demand  for  natural  gas,  there  is  a  new  drive  for 
offshore oil and gas exploration and development. The growing  importance of offshore oil and 
gas projects around  the world at a  time of high prices and  increased pressures on  supply has 
accordingly  led  to  a  greater  sense  of  vulnerability  and  concomitant  demand  for  improved 
protection  of  offshore  installations  against  resource  theft,  piracy,  terrorism,  accidents  and 
environmental damage, and natural disasters. 
 




sensibilities  of  the  post‐9/11  security  environment.  The  post‐9/11 world  has  also  seen  a  new 
emphasis  on  direct  terrorist  threats  to  the  maritime  transportation  system  and  related 
infrastructure, and the indirect exploitation of the system by terrorists to execute attacks on land 
or  in other ways  to  further  their objectives. Other problems  for coastal states  include  threats  to 
bio‐security and from marine pollution, customs infringements and other criminal activity at sea. 
 
The  myriad  of  challenges  to  security,  sovereignty  and  sovereign  rights  thus  requires  an 
increasingly high degree of coordination for enforcement effectiveness. As a consequence of this 
need, an integrated approach to maritime border protection has evolved over time in Australia, 
for example,  leading  to  the  creation of  the  Joint Offshore Protection Command  (JOPC) and  its 
ultimate evolution into the Border Protection Command (BPC). BPC’s coordination and control of 
maritime  surveillance, with  the development of  the Australian Maritime  Identification System 
(AMIS),  and  enforcement  response  to  security  infringements or  illegal  activity  throughout  the 
offshore  estate,170 potentially provides  a  sound model  for maritime  border protection  in  other 
states. One example may be the Philippines, where the model is being used to establish the Coast 
Watch South project for coordinated surveillance and enforcement in the troubled southern part 
of  the  archipelago.171  And  in  the  United  States,  the  US  Coast  Guard  also  has  developed  an 
                                                 
167 On the development of the EEZ see Ball, “The Old Grey Mare, National Enclosure of the Oceans.” 
168 See Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Maritime Patrol Review, Wellington, February 
2001. 
169 See, for example, Rachael Heath and Barry Snushall, eds., Protecting Maritime Resources: Boundary 
Delimitation, Resource Conflicts and Constabulary Responsibilities, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs 
No. 11, Sea Power Centre – Australia, Canberra, 2003. 
170 Border Protection Command, Concept of Operations, Canberra, February 2008.  
171 Philippine Navy, “Coast Watch South Operational Document (Manual on Inter-agency Maritime 
Surveillance and Response),” draft as of 30 March 2007. 










New  Zealand  Defence  Force  (NZDF)  and  Ministry  of  Fisheries,  and  also  involves  close 
cooperation with Maritime New Zealand,  the New Zealand Police, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade and Department of Conservation.173 The establishment of such a centre was a primary 
recommendation  of  the  2001  Maritime  Patrol  Review.174  The  NMCC  may  be  thought  of  as 
something akin to a “BPC lite” – closer in form and function to Australia’s old Coastwatch model, 
which was  replaced  by  JOPC.  Indeed,  the Maritime  Patrol Review  explicitly  noted  in  2001  the 
utility  of  Coastwatch  as  a  model  for  a  future  maritime  intelligence  coordination  centre.175 
Although BPC does not “own” any surveillance or response assets, it has significant operational 
responsibilities for maritime enforcement in Australia’s maritime zones, and in effect controls the 
tasking  of  certain  Australian  Defence  Force  and  Australian  Customs  and  Border  Protection 
Service assets.  It  is also Australia’s Security Forces Authority  for  response  to  cases of violence 




The maritime border protection approach  to maritime security  is  thus,  in principle, a relatively 
simple  and  uncontroversial  one  of  safeguarding  national  sovereignty,  sovereign  rights  and 
interests in national maritime zones. Nevertheless, the physically borderless, transnational nature 
of the sea, and the fact that the sea functions more as a highway than as a barrier, ensures that 




The  military  activities  approach  to  maritime  security  lies  firmly  within  the  tradition  of  the 
concept  of  common  security.  It  includes  an  emphasis  on  arms  control,  especially  of  the 
operational variety. Although both amateur and professional would‐be arms  controllers might 
hope  to  keep  alive  an  agenda  for  structural  arms  control  at  sea  –  that  is,  negotiated  arms 
limitations  or  reductions  –  it  must  be  recognized  that  there  is  no  serious  constituency  for 
negotiated  naval  arms  limitations,  let  alone  wholesale  disarmament.  Despite  this  fact,  the 
Independent World Commission on the Oceans explicitly promoted demilitarization, particularly 
the  reduction  and  eventual  elimination  of  sea‐based  nuclear  weapons.178  It  also  implicitly 
                                                 
172 See The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship. 
173 New Zealand Customs Service, “National Maritime Coordination Centre,” available online at 
http://www.customs.govt.nz/about/Who+We+Are/Operations/NMCC/National+Maritime+Coordination+C
entre.htm. For more on New Zealand’s MDA arrangements see Chris Rahman, “Maritime Domain 
Awareness in Australia and New Zealand” in Natalie Klein, Joanna Mossop and Donald R. Rothwell, eds., 
Maritime Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand, 
Routledge, London, 2009, pp. 219-221.  
174 Maritime Patrol Review, pp. 24-25, 33-35 & 41, and Annex II. 
175 Ibid., p. 24. 
176 Border Protection Command, Concept of Operations, pp. 5-7. 
177 New Zealand Customs Service, “National Maritime Coordination Centre.” 
178 The Ocean…Our Future, p. 50. 
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suggests  that navies,  left unregulated – especially  those of  the  leading naval powers – are not 
consistent with the “promotion of peace and security in the oceans.”179 
 





inherent  mobility  of  naval  platforms mean  that  naval  arms  control  cannot  meaningfully  be 
restricted to, or negotiated for, a single theatre of operations.  
 
Third,  there  are  large  asymmetries  both  between  naval  force  structures  and national  strategic 
postures.180 For example, the Chinese navy has exhibited a strong preference for submarines and 
land‐based air power  to conduct an anti‐access  focused maritime strategy based on sea and air 
denial, whereas  the U.S. Navy  has  relied  upon  sea‐based  air  power,  surface  combatants  and 
submarines to assert sea control in order to take advantage of the strategic benefits bestowed by 
the  ability  to  dominate maritime  communications,  including  the  projection  of  power  ashore. 
Geography, inter alia, exerts a strong influence on the strategic preferences of states and coalitions 
as to whether they will pursue either a maritime or a continental strategic Weltanschauung: that is, 
whether  their  primary  geostrategic  preference  and  source  of  strategic  advantage  favours  the 
pursuit of sea power or land power.181 Because of these asymmetries, naval arms control would 
cause  disproportionate  harm  to  the  strategic  interests  of  the  leading  sea  powers  and  their 
maritime‐based alliances and coalitions. 
 
Fourth, surface combatants are  inherently  flexible platforms able  to undertake a wide  range of 
roles  other  than  just  warfighting,  including  diplomatic,  search  and  rescue  and  constabulary 
functions. Combining such flexibility into a single platform provides both economies and a broad 
range of capabilities that few, if any, operators would be willing to give up. Fifth, the demand for 
naval platforms  is greater  than ever,  including  for  the border protection and ocean governance 
missions discussed above.  
 




Cold War, moreover,  suggests  that  substantive arms  reductions will only occur when political 





London  treaty  system  of  naval  arms  limitations, was  a  resounding  failure.  The  treaty  system 
                                                 
179 Ibid., pp. 44 & 48. 
180 See, for example, Eric Grove, “Confidence-building Measures at Sea: An Alternative to Naval Arms 
Control?” in Mack, A Peaceful Ocean? p. 22. 
181 See Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power, chaps 1-3; and Colin S. Gray, “Seapower and Landpower” in 
Gray and Roger W. Barnett, eds., Seapower and Strategy, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1989, pp. 
3-26. 
182 See Betts, “Systems for Peace or Causes of War?” pp. 30-40; Colin S. Gray, “Arms Control Does Not 
Control Arms,” Orbis, Vol. 37, No. 3, Summer 1993; Gray, Weapons Don’t Make War, chap. 6; and 
Patrick Glynn, Closing Pandora’s Box: Arms Races, Arms Control, and the History of the Cold War, Basic 
Books, New York, 1992. 










advocates  has  been  to  promote  the  operational  arms  control  aspects  of  naval/maritime 
confidence‐building  measures.184  A  typology  has  been  developed  dividing  CBMs  into  three 





accession  to  the Law of  the Sea Convention.186 Transparency measures can  include  information 
exchange;  “communications  measures”  such  as  establishing  networks  and  procedures  for 
communication  during  crises;  “notification  measures”  such  as  providing  prior  warning  of 
military  exercises  or  unusual  deployments;  and  “observation/inspection  measures”  such  as 
voluntarily allowing exercises to be observed and naval facilities to be  inspected, and maritime 
surveillance  regimes.187  Constraint  measures  include  “risk  reduction  measures”  such  as 
agreements  to  avoid  or  minimize  any  adverse  consequences  from  minor  confrontations  or 
accidents  between  naval  forces,  termed  incidents  at  sea  (INCSEA)  agreements; 
“exclusion/separation measures” such as demilitarized zones and military exclusion zones; and 
“constraints  on  personnel,  equipment  and  activities” which  “prohibit military  operations  that 
                                                 
183 See Robert Gordon Kaufman, Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era: The United States and Naval 
Limitation between the Two World Wars, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, esp. pp. 193-201; 
Charles H. Fairbanks, “The Washington Naval Treaty, 1922-1936” in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, 
eds., The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., University Press of America, 
Lanham, MD, 1983; and Sadao Asada, “The Revolt against the Washington Treaty: The Imperial Japanese 
Navy and Naval Limitation, 1921-1927,” Naval War College Review, Vol. XLVI, No. 3, Summer 1993. 
For an argument, however, that the naval arms limitation process ultimately benefited the U.S. Navy see 
Phillips Payson O’Brien, “Politics, Arms Control and U.S. Naval Development in the Interwar Period” in 
O’Brien, ed., Technology and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond, Routledge, London, 
2001, pp. 148-161. 
184 Most of the essays in Mack, A Peaceful Ocean? take this approach. See, especially, Grove, 
“Confidence-building Measures at Sea”; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Agreements to Prevent Incidents at Sea and 
Dangerous Military Activities: Potential Applications in the Asia-Pacific Region”; and Desmond Ball and 
Sam Bateman, “An Australian Perspective on Maritime CSBMs in the Asia-Pacific Region,” pp. 173-181. 
See also Eric Grove, “Maritime Confidence and Security Building Measures” in Sam Bateman and Stephen 
Bates, eds., Calming the Waters: Initiatives for Asia Pacific Maritime Cooperation, Canberra Papers on 
Strategy and Defence No. 114, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1996; and Stanley B. Weeks, “Incidents at Sea Agreements and Maritime Confidence-Building 
Measures” in Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates, eds., The Seas Unite: Maritime Cooperation in the Asia 
Pacific Region, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 118, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
The Australian National University, Canberra, 1996. 
185 M. Susan Pederson and Stanley Weeks, “A Survey of Confidence and Security Building Measures” in 
Ralph A. Cossa, ed., Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures, CSIS Significant Issues 
Series, Vol. XVII, No. 3, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 1995; Charles 
A. Meconis and Stanley B. Weeks, Cooperative Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Strategic 
and Arms Control Assessment, Institute for Global Security Studies, Seattle, July 1995, pp. 66-91; and 
Weeks, “Incidents at Sea Agreements and Maritime Confidence-Building Measures,” pp. 83-93. 
186 Ibid., pp. 83-84. 
187 Ibid., pp. 84-88. 
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greater  limits  on  the  military  activities  of  maritime  states  in  or  over  other  states’  exclusive 
economic zones. The forum’s work was in part informed by maritime incidents such as the April 
2001 collision of a Chinese fighter with a U.S. Navy EP‐3E intelligence gathering aircraft, various 




international  law.  To  this  end  EEZ  Group  21  released  a  set  of  non‐binding  Guidelines  in 
September 2005. Among other things the Guidelines call for prior notification to be given to the 




exciting  the  defensive  systems  of  the  coastal  State;  collecting  information  to 







is  especially  surprising,  informed no doubt by  the activities of North Korea and,  increasingly, 
China,  in  and  around  its  waters.  Nevertheless,  Japan,  as  a  maritime  nation  and  significant 
maritime  power,  and  protected  by  a  maritime‐based  alliance,  would  be  significantly 
disadvantaged,  in  strategic  terms,  if  the  Guidelines were  ever  adopted  officially  as  regional 
practice. That  is no doubt why the Japan Maritime Self‐Defense Force has thus far opposed the 
Guidelines.  The  positions  of  other maritime  powers  such  as China may  become  increasingly 
equivocal  towards  these sorts of measures also, as Chinese maritime  forces grow stronger and 
begin to assert themselves through their own regional naval activities. At present, though, China 
currently  is  trying  to  have  it  both  ways,  increasing  its  own  activities  in  regional  seas  and 
becoming more assertive in its efforts to prevent foreign activities in its own exclusive economic 





The  emphasis placed on unrestricted  freedom by naval powers and  their own 
understanding  of  their  security  interests  appears  inconsistent  with  the 
promotion of peace and security on  the oceans and at odds with  the extended 
                                                 
188 Ibid., pp. 89-93. 
189 EEZ Group 21, “Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone,” Ocean 
Policy Research Foundation, Tokyo, 16 September 2005, p. 9; and see also EEZ Group 21, Guidelines for 
Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone: A Commentary, Ocean Policy Research 
Foundation, Tokyo, 2006. For further discussion of the legal issues see Myron H. Nordquist, Tommy T.B. 
Koh and John Norton Moore, eds., Freedom of Seas, Passage Rights and the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009.  
190 On the incident see Captain Raul Pedrozo, JAGC, USN, “Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS 
Impeccable Incident,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 62, No. 3, Summer 2009, pp 101-111.  
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regulatory  power  of  coastal  states. While  prevailing  power  realities  seem  to 
suggest  that  it may not be possible  to severely restrict  the role of navies  in  the 
near  future,  the  issues  of  the  freedom  of  the  high  seas  and  national  and 
international security should be reinstated on the international agenda, so as to 





updated  to  take  into account  IWCO principles.192  In effect,  this represents an  inevitably  forlorn 
attempt  to  undermine  the Western  and,  in  particular, American,  preponderance  at  sea which 
actually underpins  the  security of  the globalized  international political and  economic  systems. 
Such sentiments are especially unhelpful  for East Asia, an  inherently maritime  region wherein 
such political and military stability as exists tends to be a function of the presence of U.S. power 
and,  in  particular,  the  U.S.  Navy.  Nevertheless,  warships  are  likely  to  be  subject  to  further 
regulation  at  least  on  environmental  grounds,193  especially with  regard  to  the  environmental 
impacts of operations and exercises. This will primarily – or at  least most effectively – be as a 
result of national rather than international measures, although many coastal states may try to use 




Prior  to  the  terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,  the regulation of  the  international maritime 
transportation  system,  primarily  through  the  International Maritime Organization  (IMO),  had 
barely  considered  security  issues.  The  main  exception  was  the  1988  Convention  on  the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), and 
its Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located 
on  the Continental Shelf;  as well  as  some practical guidance on  combating pirate  attacks. The 
SUA  Convention  and  its  Protocol were  specific  responses  to  the  hijacking  of  the  cruise  ship 
Achille Lauro  in  1985 which  established  legal measures  to  combat  future  incidents of  a  similar 





The events of 9/11  forever changed  the regulatory regime  for shipping, however. Suddenly, all 
forms  of  transportation  were  deemed  to  be  at  risk  from  terrorist  attack,  but  the  maritime 
transportation sector was deemed to be particularly vulnerable,195 not least because of its under‐
regulated nature. The  IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee was almost  immediately pushed  into 
action  by  the United  States  and  those  other  IMO members most  concerned with  preventing 
maritime  terrorism and  the globalized maritime  transportation system  from being exploited by 
terrorist groups. The most notable new maritime security measures passed by the  IMO  include 
the  International Ship  and Port Facility Security  (ISPS) Code,  added  as  an  annex on maritime 
                                                 
191 The Ocean…Our Future, p. 43. 
192 Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
193 Glenn Kerr and Barry Snushall, eds., Future Environmental Policy Trends to 2020: Impact on Ship 
Design and Operation, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 13, Sea Power Centre – Australia, 
Canberra, 2005. 
194 The Ocean…Our Future, p. 50. 
195 See, for example, The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States. W.W. Norton, New York, n.d., p. 391. 
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security  to  the  SOLAS Convention;  significant  new  Protocols  to  the  SUA Convention  and  its 
Protocol; and provisions  for  the satellite‐based  long‐range  identification and  tracking  (LRIT) of 
SOLAS‐regulated  ships.196  From  the  time  that  the  ISPS Code  entered  into  force  (1  July  2004), 
therefore, maritime  safety  and  security  became  increasingly  interconnected.197 This  connection 
also began to be applied to offshore installations in regions that were not already conflict zones. 
As  an  indicative  illustration,  in  Australia  prior  to  9/11,  worker  safety  rather  than  platform 
security had been  the  focus of measures  to  safeguard offshore  installations of  the oil  and gas 





sea, and would‐be maritime  terrorists, are  those developed under  the auspices of Chapter V of 
SOLAS  on  safety  of  navigation.  In  particular,  these  include  the  ship  automatic  identification 




this  seeming  anomaly.  First,  it  is  easier  and  less  controversial,  diplomatically,  to  negotiate 







sign of  the new security  focus  to  its many activities,  the  IMO Council announced  in December 








–  with  its  raft  of  post‐9/11  security  measures  such  as  the  24‐hour  rule,  Container  Security 
Initiative and so forth – and  informal arrangements such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, 
further  add  to  the  security  framework  affecting  the  operation  of  shipping  and  maritime 
infrastructure.200 
 
                                                 
196 For analysis of the measures see Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr, eds., Lloyd’s MIU 
Handbook of Maritime Security, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 2009. 
197 Bateman, “Capacity Building for Maritime Security Cooperation,” p. 12. 
198 See Lee Cordner, “Offshore Oil and Gas Industry Security Risk Assessment: An Australian Case Study” 
in Herbert-Burns et al., Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security. 
199 IMO, “Jakarta Statement on Enhancement of Safety, Security and Environmental Protection in the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore,” IMO/JKT 1/2, 8 September 2005; and IMO, “The Cooperative 
Mechanism between the Littoral States and User States on Safety of Navigation and Environmental 
Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,” IMO/SGP 2.1/1, 16 August 2007. 
200 See Chris Rahman, “The Evolving U.S. Framework for Global Maritime Security from 9/11 to the 
1,000-ship Navy” in Herbert-Burns, et al., Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security, pp. 39-53. 
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Henceforth, as  a  result of post‐9/11  concerns,  for  those  involved  in  all  sectors of  the maritime 
transportation industry, as well as for lawyers and others dealing in the public international law 
of shipping, “maritime security” thus is a term that denotes the safety and security regulation of 






in  terms  of  the  five  perspectives  discussed  above.  To  a  large  degree,  they  are  compatible, 
although clearly the fundamentalist approach to marine environmental security  is not favoured 







and  in  the new maritime strategy,203 although  it was employed only very  loosely  in a  literal or 
slogan‐like  sense  rather  than  as  a  throw‐back  to  the more  specific meaning  of  the  theory  of 
collective  security  itself.  In  the  collective  security  tradition Gwyn Prins has  raised  the old and 
misconceived idea of a UN Standing Naval Force, in addition to his proposal for an Ocean Guard 
that  could  be  placed  under  “effective  international  command  and  control  in  times  of  rising 
tension.”204 Like all aspects of  collective  security  idealism, however,  such proposals are wildly 













the water,”  they actively exploit  the complex and often disputed  jurisdictional arrangements  to 
their  own  advantage.205  Therefore,  taking  into  consideration  these  problematic  jurisdictional 
arrangements,  the enforcement  limitations  imposed by  the Law of  the Sea Convention, and the 
                                                 
201 The National Strategy for Maritime Security, p. 2. 
202 Admiral Mike Mullen, USN, remarks delivered to the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, Pearl Harbor, 
HI, 31 October 2006, p. 3. For analysis see Chris Rahman, The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: 
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203 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, pp. 3-4. 
204 Prins, “Maritime Security and Common Security,” pp. 38-39. 
205 See Martin Murphy, “Piracy and UNCLOS: Does International Law Help Regional States Combat 
Piracy?” in Lehr, Violence at Sea, pp. 155-182; and Murphy, “The Blue, Green and Brown: Insurgency and 
Counter-insurgency on the Water,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 28, No. 1, April 2007, pp. 73-74. 









of  regional maritime  security  requires  a multidisciplinary  approach,  necessitating  cooperation 
and coordination among all interested bodies and activities.”208 The areas promoted for regional 
maritime cooperation, to be integrated into such a comprehensive approach to regional maritime 
security,  include accession  to, and  cooperation under,  the Law of  the Sea Convention;  conflict 
prevention  at  sea; protection  and maintenance of SLOCs;  the  sharing of maritime  surveillance 
information; naval cooperation  (for confidence‐building purposes); search and rescue; maritime 




Nowhere, however, does  the memorandum explain how  this general, and worthy, entreaty  for 
cooperation  across many maritime  activities  adds  up  to  a  regional  system  for  comprehensive 
maritime security,  let alone how “all  interested bodies and activities” might be so coordinated. 
Indeed, it does not really explicate at all what a regional comprehensive maritime security system 
might  even  look  like.  That  is  hardly  surprising,  given  the  inchoate  nature  of  the  concept  of 
comprehensive security itself. Moreover, recalling Jim Rolfe’s critique of the regional applicability 
of  the  concept,  it  is  unconvincing  to  think  that  the  factors  listed  above  are  somehow  all 
interlinked  across  the  entire  Asia‐Pacific  region,  or  even  across  the  entirety  of  the maritime 
Southeast Asia sub‐region, for example. This perhaps leads to a conclusion that it is a fallacy to 
view maritime security  in comprehensive security terms; that  just because the sea  is a common 
space  and  a  connective,  transnational  medium,  not  all  aspects  of  that  medium  are  usefully 









implement  “integrated  oceans  planning  and  management,”  with  a  focus  on  marine 
environmental protection and development of ocean industries.209 Although there is a section on 
protecting  the national  interest, which notes  that “Oceans … are critical  to our security,”210  the 
security  aspects  of  the  policy  are  nevertheless  relatively  lightly  dealt with, with  a  brief  but 
reasonable  focus on maritime surveillance and enforcement  (border protection).  If security was 
not a major focus of the overall policy, however, nor has Australia’s Oceans Policy been integrated 
with defence or wider national security policy.211 In many ways this is not surprising. Can oceans 
                                                 
206 CSCAP, “Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation,” p. 1. 
207 Ibid., p. 4. 
208 Ibid., p. 7 (emphasis added). 
209 Senator the Hon Robert Hill in Environment Australia, Australia’s Oceans Policy, vol. 1, Canberra, 
1998, p. 3. 
210 Environment Australia, Australia’s Oceans Policy – Specific Sectoral Measures, vol. 2, Canberra, 1998, 
pp. 37-42. 
211 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australia’s Maritime Strategy, report of the Joint 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade inquiry, Canberra, June 2004, pp. 105-109.  
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policy  really  be  truly  “comprehensive”  along  the  lines  represented  by  the  concept  of 
comprehensive  security?  Probably  not,  for whilst  proponents  of  the  idea may  get  away with 
vagueness policymakers must deal with real world issues, especially when responsibility for the 
policy  lies with  one  government department  (or  agency)  or  another.  In  the  case  of Australia’s 
Oceans  Policy,  that  responsibility  lay  with  the  Department  of  Environment,  so  it  can  be  no 
surprise  that environmental  issues dominated. Where policy coordination between activities or 
agencies is required, the stark chasm that lies between the theory of comprehensive security and 
practice  of  policymaking  and  implementation  is  likely  to  mean  that  comprehensiveness  is 
abandoned in favour of more practicable forms of interagency coordination and cooperation. 
 




links  to national or maritime  security. The  six‐member  ad  hoc Ministerial Group  charged with 




Environment,  which  is  now  focused  primarily  on  environmental  management  within  the 




New  Zealand’s  Defence  Minister,  Wayne  Mapp,  has  spoken  in  general  terms  of  taking  a 
comprehensive security approach to matters of national security: 
 
New  Zealand’s  security  is  entwined  with  that  of  Australia’s,  our  Pacific 
neighbourhood’s,  and  that  of  international  society.  Security  is  not  just  about 
making our contribution in the unfortunate event of conflict between states. It is 
about  securing  New  Zealand’s  interests,  and  protecting  the  institutions  and 
values that help New Zealanders to  live  in the ways we prefer. This  involves a 
comprehensive  view  that  encompasses  all  aspects  of  what  security  for  New 
Zealand entails, including not just traditional national security but also the needs 
of  nation‐building,  economic  security,  environmental  security,  and  the 






                                                 
212 Healthy Sea: Healthy Society. Towards an Oceans Policy for New Zealand. Report on consultation 
undertaken by the Ministerial Advisory Committee on Oceans Policy, 30 September 2001; and Oceans 
Policy Secretariat, “International Oceans Issues,” Working Paper 11, 14 March 2003. 
213 The Ministerial Group involved the Ministers of Energy, Fisheries, and Research Science and 
Technology; Foreign Affairs and Trade; Conservation; Maori Affairs; Commerce; and Environment.  
214 See the Ministry for the Environment web site at http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/oceans/current-
work/index.html; and Joanna Vince and Marcus Haward, “New Zealand Oceans Governance: Calming 
Turbulent Waters?” Marine Policy, Vol. 33, No. 2, March 2009, pp. 412-418. 
215 Minister of Defence, Wayne Mapp, “Why a Defence Review?” speech to Massey University’s Centre 
for Defence Studies, 20 May 2009. 


















within  alliances,  coalitions  or  in  a  non‐coalition  environment,  as  part  of  an  ongoing  security 
relationship or simply on an ad hoc basis, has also  flourished.217 The proponents of cooperative 
security might argue that these types of activities serve as the requisite building blocks that will 
enable  the  security multilateralism envisaged by  the concept of cooperative  security. This  idea 
perhaps  represents  a  fundamental  flaw  in  the  concept  itself:  why  should  an  inclusive 
multilateralism be a goal, or even necessary, for the establishment or maintenance of a peaceful 
regional order? Nor does multilateralism provide an answer for most aspects of non‐traditional 
security  challenges  at  sea  in  Southeast Asia,  for  example, where  suspicion  of multilateralism 
remains  strong.  Indeed,  the  case  for multilateralism,  generally,  is weak:  coastal  states  such  as 
Indonesia  and  Malaysia  have  a  valid  point  when  they  argue  that  they  hold  the  primary 
responsibility for security in their own maritime zones; and inclusive security systems are likely 




Certainly  at  the  sub‐regional  level  in  Southeast Asia,  there  is  little  prospect  for  the  inclusive 
multilateralism  of  the  cooperative maritime  security  kind,  not  least  because  of  local  political 











                                                 
216 Ibid. 
217 For background see Chris Rahman, Naval Cooperation and Coalition Building in Southeast Asia and the 
Southwest Pacific: Status and Prospects, RAN Sea Power Centre and Centre for Maritime Policy Working 
Paper No. 7, Sea Power Centre, RAAF Fairbairn, Canberra, October 2001. 
218 Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific 
Region, July 1992. 
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a  specifically  Southwest  Pacific  version  of  Gwyn  Prins’  idea  of  an  Ocean  Guard.219  Overall, 
though,  with  that  possible  exception  of  the  Southwest  Pacific,  conflicting  national  interests 
throughout  the  Asia‐Pacific  region  will  continue  to  hinder  the  development  of  cooperative 
maritime security arrangements. 
 
The U.S. maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy  for 21st Century Seapower, as  its  title suggests, 
includes  an  emphasis  on  improving  maritime  security  cooperation:  “Expanded  cooperative 
relationships with  other  nations will  contribute  to  the  security  and  stability  of  the maritime 
domain  for  the benefit of all.”220 Nonetheless,  this should be viewed primarily as part of wider 
U.S.  efforts  to  safeguard  the  U.S.‐led  global  system  –  including  its  maritime  and  economic 
elements – rather than as an indication of an intent to pursue cooperative maritime security of the 
variety posited by the concept of cooperative security. The 1,000‐ship Navy fulfils an important 
role  in  the U.S.  strategy, which  states  that  the  initiative  “will  serve  as  a  catalyst  for  increased 




globally  linked  system  of  regional  networks  not  under American  control  thus  potentially  be 
viewed as a system of cooperative maritime security? It probably does not matter  in a practical 
sense: if it is developed and works as planned, maritime security will be improved. Perhaps it is 






                                                 
219 See Sam Bateman, “Developing a Pacific Island Ocean Guard: The Need, the Possibility and the 
Concept” in Ivan Molloy, ed., The Eye of the Cyclone: Issues in Pacific Security, University of the 
Sunshine Coast, Sippy Downs, QLD, 2004, pp. 208-224. 
220 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, p. 6. 
221 Ibid., p. 9 (emphasis added). 
222 Admiral Mike Mullen, USN, remarks delivered at the 17th International Seapower Symposium, Naval 
War College, Newport, RI, 21 September 2005. Available at: 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/speeches/mullen050921.txt. 









to  delegitimize  military‐strategic  concerns  –  perhaps  in  a  vain  hope  that  by  so  doing  such 












or  related  policy  factors  are  appropriately  viewed  as  security  issues.  The 
comprehensive  security  perspective  should  therefore  be  rejected  as  holding  no 
practicable benefit for policy – indeed it is debatable whether a truly comprehensive 
perspective  can  be  practicably  implemented,  or  even  ascertained,  at  all.  It  is 
important also to remember the admonition against securitizing particular issues for 
the  sake  of  policy  prioritization,  or  budget  politics  for  that  matter:  a  policy 
consideration  such  as  the  prevention  of,  and  response  to,  marine  pollution,  for 
example,  ought  to  be  seen  as  important  in  and  of  itself,  not  because  it  might 
conceivably, but unhelpfully, be  framed  as  a  “security”  issue. Different  states will 
have different priorities  for maritime  security depending  on  their unique  national 




2. If  the  indeterminate nature  of  “comprehensiveness”  is unhelpful,  the  fact  remains 
that the sea is a very specific natural and operating environment that requires policy 
coordination  amongst  relevant  government  departments  and  agencies. Across  the 
Tasman, this was a particular shortcoming in the Australian policy framework, with 
Australia’s  Oceans  Policy  failing  to  provide  a  sufficiently  holistic  (as  opposed  to 
“comprehensive”)  basis  for  policy  coordination  at  the  senior  officials  level  of 
government. Whereas surveillance and response coordination was greatly improved 
through  the  creation  of  the  Border  Protection  Command,  policy  coordination  by 
comparison  lagged.  The  problem was  in  theory  addressed  by  the  creation  of  the 
Strategic  Maritime  Management  Committee  (SMMC),  which  in  terms  of 
organizational  structure,  sat  beneath  the National  Security  Committee  of  Cabinet 
(NSC) in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. The SMMC involved policy 
cooperation  and  coordination  amongst  all  agencies with maritime  responsibilities, 
including many whose remits fall outside of traditional security policy areas. Indeed, 
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the  SMMC  was  established  not  only  as  a  national  oversight  body  for  maritime 
security policy, but to coordinate policy  in an holistic fashion for national maritime 
management.  Perhaps  unfortunately,  the  SMMC  was  placed  in  abeyance  by  the 
Rudd  government,  with  its  function  replaced  by  a  new  Homeland  and  Border 
Security  Policy  Coordination  Group.  The  title  of  the  new  group  clearly  reflects 
government  priorities  as well  as  its  preferred  political  catchphrase  of  “homeland 
security.” The  implication  of  the  change,  though,  is  that  there no  longer  exists  an 
holistic  national  policy  coordination  body  for maritime matters,  aside  from  those 
connected to border protection.    
 
In New  Zealand,  the  2001 Maritime  Patrol  Review  led  to  the  establishment  of  the 
National Maritime  Coordination  Centre.  The  review  itself  was  produced  by  the 
Domestic  and  External  Security  Group  (DESG),  which  supports  the  Officials 
Committee  for Domestic  and External  Security Coordination  (ODESC)  – which  in 
turn  supports  the  Cabinet  Committee  on  Domestic  and  External  Security 
Coordination – within  the Department of  the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and was 
the  first “comprehensive,  ‘whole‐of‐government’ analysis” of maritime surveillance 












threatened by any other country and  is not  likely to be  involved  in 








This  represents  a  combination  of  the  border  protection  and  ocean  governance 
approaches,  although  it  should  also  be  noted  that  the Maritime  Patrol Review was 
completed prior  to  the 9/11  terrorist attacks, and  that  the security regulation of  the 
maritime  transportation  system  has  since  been  incorporated  into  New  Zealand’s 
maritime  security policy  considerations. What  remains  lacking, however,  is a New 
Zealand  equivalent  to Australia’s  (former)  SMMC  for  overall  policy  coordination 
across all maritime‐related agencies. 
                                                 
223 Maritime Patrol Review, p. 2. The review process involved personnel from the following departments: 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Chair), Maritime Safety Authority (since renamed 
Maritime New Zealand), Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Fisheries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
New Zealand Customs Service, New Zealand Defence Force, and Treasury. 
224 Ibid., pp. 5-6. For a more diverse range of perspectives see Cozens, New Zealand’s Maritime 
Environment and Security. 






of Homeland  Security  seems  to  have  been more  an  exercise  in  the  expansion  of 
government  than  in  effective  policy  coordination  and  implementation.  Indeed  the 
U.S.  experience  suggests  that  simply  situating  different  agencies  under  the  same 
bureaucratic umbrella does not guarantee  effective  interagency  cooperation within 
the  department;  nor  does  it  assist  to  build  cooperation  with  other  relevant 
departments and external agencies. It also suggests that the Department of the Prime 




in  the  politically  competitive  ethos  of  public  bureaucracies.  Effective  interagency 
cooperation  and  coordination  is  thus  the  focus  that  needs  to  be  emphasized  in  a 







to address maritime  issues either specifically or  in depth.  It could, however, be  the 
framework document  for  the development of a genuine national maritime security 
strategy  (or  national  strategy  for  maritime  security  –  to  borrow  the  American 
terminology). The American example provides a reasonable model, although  it can 
be  criticized  for  being  too  focused  on  near‐term  concerns with  terrorism  and  the 
proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction.  A  New  Zealand  version  perhaps 
would  need  to  more  fully  address  ocean  governance,  traditional  military  and 
regional issues, as well as the obvious border protection focus; but unlike the oceans 
policy process  it would have a national security emphasis. In the absence of a New 
Zealand  equivalent  to Australia’s  SMMC  example,225 ODESC would be  the  logical 
body to develop such a strategy. The concept of a national maritime security strategy 
is also relevant  to  the many regional states  that are highly dependent upon  the sea 
for their national security. 
 
4. A  further  step  in holistic policy management must be  to  ensure  that all aspects of 
enforcement  for  national maritime  security  have  the  requisite  domestic  legislative 
backing. This  is a problem  for all coastal states, particularly  in  the current security 
environment in which all variety of maritime infrastructure may be at risk from the 
global Islamist insurgency. For the most part, security is a new consideration for the 
maritime  industry,  involving  shipping,  ports,  offshore  installations,  pipelines  and 
cables.  In  the  past,  safety  and  environmental  protection  have  been  the  primary 
drivers  of  policy  and  legislation.  There  are  likely  to  be  considerable  gaps  and 
inconsistencies  in  legislation,  particularly  in  complex  federal  systems  such  as 
Australia or Indonesia. International law can frustrate these efforts: such constraints 
limit the  legal measures that can be put  in place to secure offshore  installations, for 
                                                 
225 In Australia’s case, a national security strategy developed within the processes of the National Security 
Committee of Cabinet and a national maritime security strategy developed by the SMMC (or its successor 
group) in collaboration with BPC would be a useful policy response to the security aspects of national 
maritime management. 
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example.  Continual  legislative  review  is  likely  to  be  necessary  in  the  short  term, 
therefore,  to  ensure  that  all  relevant  enforcement  agencies  have  the  appropriate 
enforcement  powers  to  protect  all maritime  infrastructure  and maritime  security 
interests  in national maritime  zones. Australia’s  response  is  an ongoing  legislative 
review to attempt to harmonize the maritime enforcement elements of many pieces 
of  disparate  legislation.  The  evolution  of  international  law  to  assert  greater 




maritime  security,”  the  concept  itself  remains  sufficiently vague  to  be  less helpful 




security  processes,  bilateral  cooperation  or  more  restrictive  multilateralism  for 
maritime security capacity building, and operational cooperation, such as (in theory) 
the  MALSINDO  trilateral  coordinated  patrols  of  the  Straits  of  Malacca  and 
Singapore, can provide more tangible results out on the water.  
 
The  Southwest  Pacific  is  the  one  part  of  the Asia‐Pacific  region  in which  a  truly 
multilateral cooperative maritime security system might be feasible. The Niue Treaty 
provides  an  existing political  and  legal  foundation.  Should  the Pacific Patrol Boat 
project ever evolve  into a  true  regional  force  rather  than  the  current one based on 







preparations  for  external  defence  than  upon  internal  security  needs,  including 
purchasing conventional submarines, larger surface combatants and modern combat 
aircraft. On the other, the best way forward to improve maritime security on a sub‐
regional  basis  would  seem  to  be  to  build  capacity  for  both  surveillance  and 
enforcement  in  individual  states  and  to  improve  sub‐regional  cooperation.  The 
transnational  nature  of  the  sea  and  regional  political  geography  mandates  that 
cooperation  is  necessary,  but  as  noted  earlier,  political  sensitivities  and  disputes 
make effective cooperation difficult at  the best of  times. Nevertheless,  the ongoing, 
albeit  limited,  forms of  security  cooperation may be  the best  that  can  currently be 
hoped for given the state of bilateral and regional politics.226  
 
Australia’s  current  security  cooperation  engagement  and  capacity  building 
programmes,  increasingly  coordinated  using  a whole‐of‐government  approach  to 
assistance,  seem  to  be  effective  instruments  of  policy  given  the  extant  political 
constraints.  The Australian  experience with  coordination  and  control  of maritime 
surveillance  and  enforcement  provides  a  particularly  useful model  for  emulation, 
modified  for  local  circumstances.  Australia  is  thus  involved  with  assisting  the 
Philippines establish its Coast Watch South project along the principles of the Border 
                                                 
226 For further analysis see Rahman, “The International Politics of Combating Piracy in Southeast Asia.” 





generally,  on  a  sub‐regional  or  regional  basis.  This  type  of  capacity‐building 













Strategic  context  matters  in  this  regard:  the  security  of  shipping  increasingly  is 
viewed in non‐traditional security terms, for example, because the gravest threats to 
seaborne trade currently are posed by terrorist attacks and, secondarily, from piracy 
and  armed  robbery  at  sea;  that  is,  by  irregular  and  non‐state  sources. During  the 
Cold War,  by  contrast,  SLOC  security was  associated primarily with  the  threat  of 
attack by Soviet maritime forces in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. Thus, as we 
can see, the idea of SLOC security evokes a similar mission in each of the two eras – 
protection  of  shipping  – which  in  the  current  threat  environment,  however,  has 




envisaged by  the Global Maritime Partnership  initiative,  for  example228  –  and  also 
ubiquitous, as the terrorist enemy is both elusive and globally postured, demanding 
a  greater  naval  presence  at  sea,  all  in  a  period  of  ever  diminishing  naval  force 
structures. 
 
Moreover,  although  operations  in  support  of  the  mission  to  counter  the  global 
Islamist  insurgency are conducted against  irregular and unconventional enemies,  is 
it really productive to think of such missions as a part of the non‐traditional security 
agenda? Counter‐insurgency  is  hardly  a  novel mission;  after  all,  it  often  requires 
combat  operations,  and  is  conducted  against  a  politically motivated  enemy who 
operates  strategically.  Counter‐insurgency  certainly  is  different  in  character  than 




security  issue. Countering pirates was one of  the  earliest of naval  tasks  stretching 
back to antiquity.229 It has been argued that some navies of the ancient world in fact 
                                                 
227 Rahman, The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative, pp. 3-7 & 23-26. 
228 Ibid., pp. 4-8. 
229 Clark G. Reynolds, Navies in History, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1998, chap. 2. 









nineteenth  century,  with  the  evolution  of  more  identifiably  “modern”  navies, 
countering piracy and other constabulary operations became commonplace missions 
for Western navies,  especially  for  the Royal Navy, which used  its  era of maritime 
dominance to police the world’s oceans.233 As noted previously, the US Navy fulfils a 






coast  guards.  The  good  order  at  sea mission  nonetheless  is  a  growth  industry  in 








to  high  seas  fisheries  enforcement  in  the  Western  and  Central  Pacific  Fisheries 
Convention  (WCPFC)  area,  a  convention  to  which  each  is  a  party.234  The 
unfamiliarity derives more from legal and geographical factors than from the nature 





The  second  role  is maritime  counter‐insurgency,  assuming  that  the global  Islamist 
insurgency is going to stretch into the medium or long term. The MDA collection and 
sharing  requirement  for  the  prevention  of  terrorist  attacks  is  one  aspect  of  this 
mission,  whether  under  the  Global  Maritime  Partnership  moniker  or  not. 
Nevertheless, navies are not the sole, and unlikely to become the primary, collection 
instruments  for  MDA  information.  The  second  aspect  of  maritime  counter‐
insurgency is to deter and defeat insurgents in the littorals, both on the water and on 
land,  and  provide  support  to  land,  special  operations  and  interagency  forces.  To 
                                                 
230 See Gregory P. Gilbert, Ancient Egyptian Sea Power and the Origin of Maritime Forces, Foundations of 
International Thinking on Sea Power No. 1, Sea Power Centre – Australia, Canberra, 2008, pp. 107-108. 
231 Ibid., p. 108. 
232 John Francis Guilmartin, Gunpowder & Galleys: Changing Technology & Mediterranean Warfare at 
Sea in the 16th Century, rev. ed., Conway Maritime Press, London, 2003, p. 36; and see also Reynolds, 
Navies in History, chap. 4. 
233 See Semmel, Liberalism and Naval Strategy, esp. chap. 3; and Reynolds, Navies in History, chap. 10.   
234 See Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western 
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Maritime Resources, esp. pp. 100-102. 





Malayan  Emergency,  Confrontation with  Indonesia  (konfrontasi)  and  the  Vietnam 
War.235 U.S. maritime  forces have been conducting  this post‐9/11 mission  in Africa, 




The  span  of  maritime  operations  expounded  in  the  Royal  Australian  Navy’s 
Australian Maritime Doctrine  includes most of  the  types of operations  involved with 
counter‐insurgency, such as aspects of combat operations at and from the sea, logistic 
support  to  land  operations  (including  naval  platforms  acting  as  sea  bases),  the 
coercive element of shaping operations, and peace enforcement.238 These missions are 
also consistent with the guidance of the RAN’s Future Maritime Operating Concept 
2025.239  The  Royal  New  Zealand  Navy  also  includes  these  roles  amongst  its 
operational capabilities across the spectrum of operations.240 Nevertheless, it may be 
worthwhile for both navies to consider explicitly the needs of counter‐insurgency in 
future plans and documents.  In  the RAN’s case,  these needs could be  incorporated 
into  the  next  edition  of  the  doctrine  (to  be  released  in  2010),  including  relatively 
unfamiliar aspects such as riverine operations. Many navies do not have formalized 
maritime  doctrine,  however,  yet  the  development  of  such  a  document may  be  a 
useful  way  by  which  to  assert  the  need  for  better  surveillance  and  response 





at  sea  and  counter  insurgency  will  differ  depending  on  the  particular  navy  in 
question. Navies already structured primarily for constabulary roles are unlikely to 
be  greatly  affected  by  new  demands  to  maintain  good  order  at  sea,  although 




Malaysia  require  significantly  larger  numbers  of  small  or  smallish,  relatively 
unsophisticated platforms  such as patrol boats and OPVs. Numbers also  count  for 





to which  the New  Zealand  government will  be  prepared  to maintain  a  credible 
                                                 
235 On Britain’s post-War maritime counter-insurgency experiences, for example, see Tim Benbow, 
“Maritime Forces and Counter-insurgency,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 28, No. 1, April 2007, pp. 
80-95. 
236 Naval Operations Concept 2006, p. 20.  
237 See, for example, Greg Nash and David Stevens, Australia’s Navy in the Gulf: From Countenance to 
Catalyst, 1941-2006, Topmill, Silverwater, NSW, 2006, pp. 78-90.  
238 Royal Australian Navy, Australian Maritime Doctrine, RAN Doctrine 1, Department of Defence, 
Canberra, 2000, pp. 55-68. 
239 Royal Australian Navy, Plan Blue 2006, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2006, pp. 10-11. 
240 Royal New Zealand Navy, 2008 Strategic Plan, RNZN 148, p. 7, figure 1. 
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maritime  combat  capability over  the medium  to  long  term, with  the  two ANZAC‐
class  frigates badly  in need of combat capability upgrades, and which will come  to 
the  end  of  their  service  lives  around  2025.241  Wellington’s  attitude  to  combat 
capability  is  potentially  problematic.  Unfortunately,  the  Maritime  Patrol  Review’s 
somewhat  complacent  attitude  towards  the  potential  for New Zealand  to  become 
embroiled in armed conflict is perhaps indicative of Wellington’s Weltanschauung. It 
is all too easy to suggest that from the perspective of February 2001 it was impossible 
to  predict  that  the  NZDF  would  soon  be  fighting  in  an  unconventional  war  in 
Afghanistan,  yet  that  example  aptly demonstrates  the  inherent unpredictability  of 
the  international  strategic  environment.  The  next  shock  might  as  easily  involve 
conventional warfare at sea: we simply can not know in advance. The Maritime Patrol 
Review’s view, then, as an example, that “New Zealand does not need to maintain a 
maritime  patrol  force  that  includes  an  anti‐submarine  capability,”242  based  on  a 




rather  than  as  a medium  for  commercial  and  strategic mobility:  “New  Zealand, 
protected as it is by large ocean distances, enjoys a degree of isolation from many of 
the  threats  to maritime  security  that  concern  other  countries.”244  Yet  as  the  great 
American  naval  strategist,  Alfred  Thayer  Mahan,  liked  to  emphasise,  “the  sea 
presents itself from the political and social point of view … [as] a great highway.”245 
Distance  itself  is  no  guarantor  of  security,  as  New  Zealand’s  own  history 









For  larger,  high  technology‐focused  navies,  however,  the  demand  for  greater 
constabulary  and  counter‐insurgency  presence  at  sea  poses  perhaps  even  more 
difficult  questions  of  balancing  future  force  structure  priorities  and  financial 
resources “between the hard and soft variants of maritime security.”247 Thus there are 
two competing needs  for  the  larger and more sophisticated navies. First,  there  is a 




which  require  small  numbers  of  large  but  relatively  unsophisticated  amphibious 
                                                 
241 Ibid., p. 26. 
242 Maritime Patrol Review, p. 23. 
243 New Zealand Government, “The Government’s Defence Policy Framework,” June 2000, esp. pp. 3-4. 
244 Maritime Patrol Review, p. 5. 
245 A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, 5th ed., Dover Publications, New 
York, 1987 (reprint of 1894 ed.), p. 25. 
246 See, for example, I.C. McGibbon, Blue-water Rationale: The Naval Defence of New Zealand 1914-
1942, Government Printer, Wellington, 1981. 
247 Till, Globalization, p. 12. 








tightly  designed.  The  future  fleet  is  similarly  constrained  and will  continue  to  be 
based  around  a  small  number  of  sophisticated multi‐mission  ships.248  There  are, 
therefore, next to no opportunities to trade any of those ships for greater numbers of 
smaller or  less sophisticated platforms. Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper has a 
strong  maritime  focus  in  recognition  of  the  increasingly  tense  regional  strategic 
environment, and actually plans  to  increase  the size, sophistication and capabilities 
of future naval platforms249; which may in turn create added dilemmas for the RNZN 
if  it becomes  less capable over  time,  therefore making  interoperability between  the 
two forces more difficult. Further, if permanent specialized platforms are required in 
the future by Australia for high seas fisheries enforcement or patrolling in Antarctic 
waters,  these  need  not  necessarily  be  naval  assets;  as  is  the  case  with  the  ship 





traditional  aspects  of  maritime  security  needs  to  be  sounded.  Whilst  many  non‐traditional 
aspects  are  important,  especially  those of border protection  and homeland  security,  and good 














the  sea  in  the  sense of appropriating  it  for one’s own use,  and more of  ‘making  it  secure’  for 
everyone but the enemies of the system to use.”250 “Making it secure,” however, requires that U.S. 
and  allied maritime  power maintains  a  degree  of  preponderance  and  the  ability  to  take  full 
advantage of the strategic mobility afforded by the sea.  
 
The  need  for  continued  freedom  of  navigation  poses  potentially  difficult  diplomatic 
considerations  for  New  Zealand  –  and  even  more  so  for  Australia  given  its  geographical 
                                                 
248 Plan Blue 2006, p. 13. 
249 Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Canberra, 
May 2009. For analysis see Jack McCaffrie and Chris Rahman, “Australia’s 2009 Defense White Paper: A 
Maritime Focus for Uncertain Times,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 1, (forthcoming Winter 
2010). 
250 Till, Globalization, p. 8. 
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of other states  to high seas  freedoms,  including navigation and overflight,  in  the New Zealand 
exclusive economic zone.251 
 
In  fact,  it needs  to be understood  that effective management of  the oceans and prioritization of 
other  non‐traditional  maritime  security  issues  will  be  unsustainable  in  times  of  widespread 
conflict or chaos. The  self‐serving and ahistorical assumption held by many proponents of  the 




military  historian  Jeremy  Black  concluded  in  one  of  his  many  studies  on  the  topic:  “One 
prediction seems safe: talk of the obsolescence, even end, of war will prove misplaced, and will 
be mocked  by  the  rictus on  the  face  of  the dead.”255 The  current  liberal  international political 
system, based around the globalized connections of a sea power‐protected order of international 
trade, is thus facing a multitude of challenges from across the threat spectrum.256 Defending that 
U.S.‐led maritime system  is  in  the  interests of all who benefit  from  it, and system defence will 
remain a vital prerequisite for the promotion of liberal ideals and institutions, including the non‐
traditional security notions of protection and management of the oceans. 
                                                 
251 Ministry for the Environment, “Cabinet Paper: Proposal for Exclusive Economic Zone Environmental 
Effects Legislation,” Cab 07-C-0751, Office of the Minister for the Environment, Cabinet Policy 
Committee, para. 271.b., updated 10 July 2008. 
252 Colin S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2005, esp. 
chap. 2. 
253 Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006. 
254 Robin Fox, “Fatal Attraction: War and Human Nature,” The National Interest, No. 30, Winter 1992/93, 
pp. 11-20. 
255 Jeremy Black, War and the New Disorder in the 21st Century, Continuum, London, 2004, p. 173. 
256 See, for example, Niall Ferguson, “Sinking Globalization,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2, March/April 
2005, pp. 64-77. 






AIS      Automatic Identification System 
AMIS      Australian Maritime Identification System 
APEC      Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation [forum] 
ARF      AEAN Regional Forum 
ASEAN    Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
BPC      Border Protection Command 
CBM      confidence‐building measure 
CSCAP     Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region 
CSCE      Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
DESG      Domestic and External Security Group 
EEZ      exclusive economic zone 
IMO      International Maritime Organization 
INCSEA    incidents at sea [agreement] 
ISPS [Code]    International Ship and Port Facility Security [Code]  
IWCO      Independent World Commission on the Oceans 
JOPC      Joint Offshore Protection Command 
LOSC      UN Convention on the Law of the Sea  
LRIT      long‐range identification and tracking 
MDA      maritime domain awareness 
NATO      North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NMCC      National Maritime Coordination Centre 
NPCSD     North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue 
NPD      non‐provocative defence 
NSC      National Security Committee of Cabinet 




































The Centre will  interact with  similar  institutions  and particularly  in  the Asia‐Pacific  region  to 
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